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Abstract
New methodological contributions for modelling and analyzing conflicts evolving over
time are developed to provide strategic insights into the sustainability of equilibria. More
specifically, key characteristics of evolving conflicts are identified in order to recognize a
long-term conflict. A unique procedure for assessing robustness of equilibria is introduced
to measure the possibility of deviation from these potential resolutions. By considering
partial achievement of an option or course of action, attempts for a decision maker to
improve an equilibrium situation can be formally taken into account. As a consequence of
these advancements, certain challenges found in an ongoing Canadian energy conflict can
be formally investigated, better understood, and eventually resolved.
There have been many successes in the modelling and analysis of strategic conflicts
using the Graph Model for Conflict Resolution. But, as illustrated by the re-occuring Great
Canadian Hydroelectric Power conflict, many important obstacles remain. This conflict,
between the Canadian province of Newfoundland and Labrador (NL) and the province
of Que´bec (QC), continued for over half a century, passing through several distinct stages
and raising questions that are difficult to answer using the standard graph model approach.
These questions are addressed in this thesis, and the new models and techniques developed
are then demonstrated using the NL-QC conflict.
A framework for conflict characterization is suggested to help analysts understand the
different stages of a conflict that evolves over time. Particularly problematic are instances
when a conflict reaches an equilibrium, maintains it for some time, and then re-starts and
shifts to another equilibrium. Traditional conflict resolution models, which analyze only a
single round of a conflict during a specific period of time, cannot explain such observations.
The conflict characterization is specifically designed to provide input parameters for models
of conflicts that evolve over time. A new representation, the enhanced preference graph
iii
model, includes decision makers’ preferences, allowing for an expeditious and intuitive
interpretation of some stability questions.
One major issue is the sustainability of equilibrium. In a conflict that continues for half
a century, it is possible for an equilibrium to be reached, maintained for a few decades,
but then to fall apart. Can the resolution of strategic conflicts be made sustainable? The
concept of Level of Freedom is introduced to provide a measure of equilibrium robustness
that facilitates the ranking of equilibria based on their relative robustness and offers insight
into this form of long-term stability.
In a graph model, a decision maker’s strategy is a selection of his or her options. Hence,
an option is either taken or not selected within a given state. To make a graph model
easier to link to reality, a modelling structure is proposed that allows binary (two-level)
options to be replaced by options with more than two levels. This new structure facilitates
the representation of preference in the modelling stage and the understanding of conflict
evolution within the analysis stage. Combined with concepts relating to the robustness of
equilibria, the utilization of multi-level options makes a graph model more expressive of
reality and easier to understand.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Overview
Conflicts take place every day on multiple levels. They can happen in personal life, in
government and in business, and they may be local, regional, national, or international.
Conflicts can be more or less deadly and costly (Cranna and Bhinda, 1994; Abadie and
Gardeazabal, 2003; Hess, 2003; Omosa, 2005), and can be exemplified by physical fights,
games, or debates (Pieper, 2008). As human civilization develops, conflicts may become
less physical confrontations, and more strategic. Amos (1880) predicted that in the future,
conflicts will be more humane and wars may disappear because “the immorality of killing
humans would be universally recognized” (Amos, 1880; Pieper, 2008).
More than a century after Amos’ prediction in 1880, wars have not disappeared, but
have become more strategic and less random (Pieper, 2008). Conflicts are more often
in the form of games, where the goal of one decision maker (DM) is to outwit rather
than to eliminate. Analysis and understanding of conflicts can be obtained from multiple
1
perspectives, including social, political, psychological, and strategic.
Models of conflict resolution are used to analyze strategic conflicts between two or more
DMs (Kilgour and Hipel, 2005). Nonetheless, because many conflicts seem to evolve over
time, current modelling techniques may be inadequate for investigating long-term conflicts,
despite the importance of assisting DMs and mediators to resolve these conflicts. The
many examples of strategic conflicts, which have been formally studied, include the Cuban
Missile Crises (Allison, 1969; Fraser and Hipel, 1983; Hipel et al., 2011), the Flathead
River conflict (Li et al., 2004), the Salmon Aquaculture conflict (Noakes et al., 2003), and
the Great Canadian Hydroelectric Power conflict (Feehan and Baker, 2007; Feehan, 2011;
Matbouli et al., 2014b).
1.2 Motivation
The idea of this thesis started with the study of a real life conflict between two Canadian
provinces over a water resource that produces a tremendous amount of hydroelectric power
(Matbouli et al., 2014b). In particular, the Great Canadian Hydroelectric Power conflict
(Feehan and Baker, 2007; Feehan, 2011; Matbouli et al., 2012b, 2014b) is a long-term
conflict that evolved over time and was not resolved at historically-reached equilibria over
time. These equilibria were temporary and the conflict continued. This conflict, which is
strategically analyzed in Chapter 3, expressed itself in several rounds at different points in
time.
Although the Graph Model for Conflict Resolution (GMCR) (Fang et al., 1993; Hipel,
2009a,b; Kilgour and Eden, 2010; Hipel et al., 2011) has provided some insightful results,
it does not explain why some conflicts tend to continue even after reaching an equilibrium.
Can an equilibrium fail to be a resolution? Would a different equilibrium have caused
2
the conflict to stabilize and not evolve? Despite the fact that all rounds of the conflict
are closely related, they must be treated separately in GMCR. Therefore, in view of the
aforementioned limitations, it is important to develop a model that unifies the treatment of
long-term conflicts, to refine the definition of an equilibrium such that a resolution should
be sustainable, and to provide insights into how a conflict may evolve over time.
1.3 Objectives
The aim of this research is to study how conflict resolution can be made sustainable. A
resolution that is sustainable is a resolution that is an equilibrium, which is not temporary
but permanent. To accomplish this goal, it will require refinements to the definition of an
equilibrium in GMCR, and a framework to model and treat rounds of a conflict together
as one, in order to provide DMs with insightful conflict resolution information.
In summary, the objectives are
• Understand why some equilibria are temporary,
• Enhance the GMCR to account for the evolution of conflicts,
• Develop a measure to evaluate robustness of equilibria.
1.4 Organization of the Thesis
This thesis is divided into seven chapters as shown in Figure 1.1. The first Chapter is an
introduction to the objectives and motivation of this thesis. In Chapter 2, literature on
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conflict theory and the development of conflict models are summarized. Chapters 3 to 6
contain the research carried out to achieve the objectives of the thesis, as outlined below:
Chapter 3 presents a strategic analysis of the Great Canadian Hydroelectric Power
conflict that motivated this research. This work shows an application of the original GMCR
to an ongoing long-term conflict. It was used as a case study to identify and test needed
improvements to the graph model. This chapter is based on three published papers by
Matbouli et al. (2012a,b, 2014b).
Chapter 4: Characterization of a Conflict provides a descriptive model of a conflict in
general and gives some insights into the common characteristics of long-term conflict. Also
included is an enhancement of the original graph model that illustrates the preferences of
DMs right on the graph. This work is largely based on Matbouli et al. (2013a, 2014d).
Chapter 5: Robustness of Equilibria in the Graph Model for Conflict Resolution presents
a fresh concept that measures the robustness of equilibria in conflict resolution. This
chapter introduces Level of Freedom to tackle the dilemma of equilibrium robustness in
conflict resolution. This chapter is largely based on published papers by Matbouli et al.
(2013c, 2014a, 2015c).
Chapter 6: Multi-Level Options in the Graph Model for Conflict Resolution In this
chapter, a new structure of options is proposed to make modelling in GMCR more expres-
sive of reality. An expansion to the traditional binary option structure to allow multiple
levels of option selections is proposed. Finally, in Chapter 7, a summary of contributions,
ideas for future research, and concluding remarks are presented.
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Figure 1.1: Organization of the Thesis
1.4.1 Thesis Integration
Although each methodology chapter (4 to 6) represents a distinct contribution, together
these chapters contribute to the original goal as stated in the title of this thesis—Sustainable
Conflict Resolution: Modelling, Analysis, and Strategic Insights—in two general directions:
modelling and analysis.
Enhancements to the modelling aspects of conflict resolution are presented in Chap-
ters 4 and 6. In Chapter 4, an initial characterization procedure is proposed to assist in
understanding the time status of a conflict and its evolution, including improvement to
illustration features of the graph model to make preferences visible in the graph. This
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advancement is expected to enhance the visual comprehension of a conflict by an analyst
or a DM. Then, in Chapter 6, a new concept of multi-level options is introduced to the
graph model in order to make the model more expressive of reality.
On the other hand, contributions to the analysis capabilities of the graph model are
presented in Chapter 5, where a fresh concept of robustness of equilibria within the graph
model is proposed for the first time. This chapter presents a methodology that will enable
an analyst to differentiate among equilibria based on their robustness or resiliency to
change. Finally, in the concluding chapter, a discussion of the contribution of the presented
methodologies is presented.
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Chapter 2
Literature Review
In this chapter, a review of literature related to conflict resolution and modelling is pre-
sented. First, a brief introduction about the theory of conflict is given. Then, a summary
of conflict resolution models and solution concepts is discussed.
2.1 Conflict Theory
Conflict is a complex and dynamic phenomenon (Jeong et al., 2008). A strategic conflict
occurs when two or more decision makers (DMs) pursue incompatible goals (Galtung,
2008). In a formal definition, conflict is a special form of incompatibility where the variables
are the goals, and units are the actors (Galtung, 2008).
A conflict is also a contradiction where the acceptability region is located in the incom-
patibility region (Galtung, 2008). Simply, a conflict is about incompatible goals. Goals in
conflicts are often dimensional. For a gradient goal, the drive for conflict or the motivation
to continue pursuing the goal is variable along the line of the goal (Galtung, 2008). This
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means that achieving a goal in a conflict is not necessarily described in a binary relation;
instead, achieving a goal can be described in a continuous, discrete, or fuzzy manner,
as there are different levels of achieving the goal in a conflict. This concept enables the
compromise where a DM partially accomplishes a goal as a result of engaging in a conflict.
On the other hand, actors, DMs or players in a conflict can be individuals; groups of
people; highly structured organizations, such as companies and governments; or sets of
these actors such as societies or nations (Galtung, 2008).
Conflicts may be vertical or horizontal (Galtung, 2008). In a vertical conflict, one DM is
superior to others. Three features of a vertical conflict are: unequal exchange, penetration,
and fragmentation. In an unequal exchange, a vertical structure exists among the DMs. For
example, a manager and a reporting employee. Penetration happens when a DM influences
the goal realization of another. For instance, in a well-controlled media, the government
may choose to determine the topics of interests for its citizens. Fragmentation, on the other
hand, is the ability of a superior DM to prevent coalition among other individuals or groups.
Therefore, a conflict may be partially vertical when some of the aforementioned features
exist. Nevertheless, due to the dynamic nature of conflict, a conflict may start as a vertical
and move toward horizontal. An example of that scenario is shown in revolution against
dictatorships, where the centralized government controls the perception of freedom and
justice, and acts against gatherings among its people. When a revolution starts, it begins
in a weak position but may become equally powerful, leading to the features of horizontal
conflicts, where there is equity in the division of power, equal realization of goals, and
equal ability to form coalitions and associations with other DMs (Galtung, 2008).
Additionally, conflicts take place in one of three forms: fights, games, and debates
(Rapoport, 1974; Pieper, 2008). These three forms are categorized based on the goals
of the conflict. In fights, the goals of DMs are to eliminate, harm, or incapacitate their
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opponents (Rapoport, 1974; Pieper, 2008). In games, the aim of DMs is to outwit each
other without necessarily harming them. Finally, in debates, it is neither the aim to harm or
outwit, but rather to bring different opinions closer together by means of communications
(Pieper, 2008). As modernity and civilization develop, conflicts tend to be more like games
and debates, rather than fights (Amos, 1880). Even now, fights are less physical and more
strategic (Pieper, 2008). There are two features that distinguish games. First, in games
there are no physical interactions, ruling out violence. Second, DMs in games adhere to
certain rules that are either imposed within a given environment or agreed upon by all
DMs (Pieper, 2008).
2.2 Conflict Resolution Models
Generally decision-making problems can be categorized based on the number of DMs and
objectives. In a situation where a single DM has one objective, linear and dynamic pro-
gramming methods can be used to optimize making decisions (Hipel, 1992a,b). Conflicts
are decision problems where multiple DMs and multiple objectives exist. This is a more
complex form of decision problem; yet, it is the least researched topic among other types
of decision-making scenarios (Fang et al., 1993).
A conflict resolution model is an abstract of a real life conflict where two or more DMs
are engaged in a dispute (Fang et al., 1993; Hipel, 2009a,b; Kilgour and Eden, 2010). Mod-
elling conflicts fall under noncooperative game theory where DMs act independently (Fang
et al., 1993; Hipel and Obeidi, 2005). There are a number of ways to model a conflict:
normal form (Von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944), extensive form (Von Neumann and
Morgenstern, 1944; Kuhn, 1953), option form (Howard, 1971), and the graph model (Kil-
gour et al., 1987; Fang et al., 1993; Hipel, 2009a,b; Kilgour and Eden, 2010; Hipel et al.,
9
2011).
The normal form is usually used to present a two-person game in a matrix, where
the columns represent strategies available to one player, and the rows represent strategies
available to the other. Each cell represents a combination of column and row strategy,
which is useful to present compact games. In the normal form, all moves seem reversible,
which is not always the case. An improvement over the normal form is the extensive
form, which is a tree-like format that shows moves when they are available unilaterally.
Nonetheless, because the extensive form branches out to show every possible move from
each node, a conflict presented this way can be very large and hard to work with. In
contrast, the option form, which uses a tabular format, can present large games (Wang
et al., 1989), but lacks the ability to illustrate limitations in moves and countermoves. The
option form is widely used to model conflicts (Howard, 1971; Fang et al., 1993). Finally,
the graph model is the most advanced form to present moves that are possible for a DM,
reversible, irreversible, or common. It also handles cardinal as well as ordinal preferences
of DMs. The graph model can be used to present the moves of one DM, or combined to
present the collective moves and countermoves of all DMs (Kilgour et al., 1987; Fang et al.,
1993; Kilgour and Hipel, 2005; Inohara and Hipel, 2008a,b; Hipel, 2009a,b; Kilgour and
Eden, 2010; Hipel et al., 2011).
2.3 The Graph Model for Conflict Resolution (GMCR)
The Graph Model for Conflict Resolution (GMCR) (Kilgour et al., 1987; Fang et al., 1993;
Kilgour and Hipel, 2005; Hipel, 2009a,b; Kilgour and Eden, 2010; Hipel et al., 2011) is
a systematic chess-like approach that is used to analyze strategic conflicts. GMCR uses
solution concepts inspired by game-theoretic equilibrium definitions in order to model
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interactions amongst DMs under conflicts. The use of GMCR has several advantages over
classical game-theoretic approaches in the analysis of conflicts. First, GMCR is flexible in
representing large conflicts, compared to normal or extensive games. Additionally, conflicts
represented in GMCR can handle moves that are not only reversible, but also irreversible
or common. Moreover, GMCR can represent complex preference structures of DMs, such
as cardinal, transitive, and intransitive preferences.
Definition 1. A graph model for conflict resolution is defined as G = 〈N,S, {Ai}i∈N , {i
,≺i,∼i}i∈N〉, where N is the set of all DMs, S is the set of feasible states, Ai is the set
of unilateral moves available for DM i such that Ai ⊆ S × S, and {i,≺i,∼i} represents
DM i’s preference relation, such that for any s, q ∈ S, s i q means state s is more
preferred by DM i than state q, s ≺i q indicates that state s is less preferred for DM i than
state q, and s ∼i q means DM i is indifferent between state s and state q.
Definition 2. In a graph model G, the reachable list for DM i (Fang et al., 1993) i ∈ N
from state s ∈ S denoted by Ri(s) = {q ∈ S : (s, q) ∈ Ai}, is the set of states to which
DM i can move unilaterally from state s. Similarly, the unilateral improvement (UI) list
of moves is denoted by R+i (s), is a subset of R(s) defined by {q ∈ R(s) : q i s}. The lists
R=i (s) ⊆ R(s) 3 {q ∈ R(s) : q ∼i s} and R−i (s) ⊆ R(s) 3 {q ∈ R(s) : q ≺i s} are defined
analogously such that R+i (s) ∪R−i (s) ∪R=i (s) = Ri(s).
Hence, if there is a move between states s and q such that s ∼i q, the move is considered
a unilateral move (UM) available to DM i between indifferent states, and it is denoted
by R=i (s). Moreover, in case s i q, the move from s to q is considered a unilateral
disimprovement (UD) and it is denoted by R−i (s).
The resolution of a conflict is assumed to take place when the conflict becomes stable,
as is assumed based on several sociological scenarios (Fang et al., 1993). From DM’s
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position in a conflict, systematic what-if questions can be asked to investigate the available
choices. When all DMs find a certain scenario of a conflict acceptable, then this scenario
is considered a possible resolution or equilibrium.
2.3.1 Stability Definitions
There are a number of stability concepts used in conflict resolution. Considering the pref-
erences of DMs, their available moves and countermoves, and stability definitions identify
the likelihood of a state being accepted. For example, a DM who cannot unilaterally im-
prove to a more preferred state, his or her state is considered stable for this particular DM.
The previous example is called Nash stable (R) (Nash, 1950, 1951). However, a state that
is stable for one player may not necessarily be stable for others. A resolution exists only
when an equilibrium is reached, which happens when all DMs find the same state to be
stable.
Other stability definitions include general metarationality (GMR) (Howard, 1971), sym-
metric metarationality (SMR) (Howard, 1971), sequential stability (SEQ) (Fraser and
Hipel, 1979, 1984), limited-move stability (Lh) (Zagare, 1984; Kilgour, 1985; Kilgour et al.,
1987), and nonmyopic stability (NM) (Brams and Wittman, 1981; Kilgour, 1984, 1985;
Kilgour et al., 1987). The foresight by which these stability definitions investigate what-if
scenarios is different. In Nash stability, the oversight is considered low (Fang et al., 1993)
because it considers only one move beyond present point. GMR and SEQ take into account
one step further to examine countermoves, and SMR two steps. Limited-move stability
has variable foresight; the analyst defines the horizon, or number of foreseeable steps. Fi-
nally, nonmyopic stability provides the highest level of foresight. It extends limited-move
stability to take into account all possible steps beyond a certain state (Fang et al., 1993).
Nonetheless, both limited-move and nonmyopic stability assume transitive preferences.
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Primary stability concepts, defined below, are used to analyze DM’s stability in a con-
flict throughout this thesis when needed. These stability concepts include Nash (Nash,
1950, 1951), sequential sanctioning (SEQ) (Fraser and Hipel, 1979, 1984), general meta-
rational (GMR) (Howard, 1971), and symmetric metarational (Howard, 1971). First, the
Nash stable states for i ∈ N , SNashi ⊆ S are defined as follows:
Definition 3. For i ∈ N, state s ∈ SNashi ⇐⇒ R+i (s) = ∅.
Thus, a state s ∈ S is Nash stable for DM i ∈ N if and only if (iff) DM i has no UI
from s. In Nash stability, a DM looks one move ahead from the present state, considering
only his or her own preference.
The next definition, sequential stability (SEQ), extends the consideration for DM i’s
foresight to two moves, where the DM takes into account possible sanctions of a UI by
other DMs.
Definition 4. For i ∈ N, state s ∈ SSEQi ⇐⇒ ∀q ∈ R+i (s),∃x ∈ R+N−i(q) 3 x -i s.
A state s is sequentially stable for DM i iff any UI from state s is sanctioned by a
countermove from DM N − i, where N − i is the set of all DMs except i. Note that any
Nash stable state is sequentially stable, and hence, SNashi ⊆ SSEQi .
The difference between SEQ and GMR, which is defined below, is that in SEQ, the
threat to sanction a UI is credible because it will result in an improved position for the
sanctioning DM, whereas, in GMR, the sanctioning DM does not consider his or her own
benefit. GMR is a more conservative stability definition; therefore, it is a weaker stability
concept than SEQ.
Definition 5. For i ∈ N, state s ∈ SGMRi ⇐⇒ ∀q ∈ R+i (s), ∃x ∈ RN−i(q) 3 x -i s.
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Table 2.1: Foresight of Focal Decision Maker in Different Stability Conditions
Stability Definitions Foresight Focal DM Opponent DM
Nash (r) One move UI -
Sequential Stability (SEQ) Two moves UI UI
General Metarationality (GMR) Two moves UI UI, UD
Symmetric Metarationality (SMR) Three moves UI UI, UD
A state s ∈ S is general metarational (GMR) for DM i, if and only if any UI by DM i
from state s to q is sanctioned by a unilateral move (UM) by any DM N − i from q to x
such that state x is not more preferred than state s by DM i. When the GMR definition
is extended to see if the focal DM is able to recover from sanctioning, the result is the
definition of SMR stability, in which the focal DM cannot escape from a sanction.
Definition 6. For i ∈ N, state s ∈ SSMRi ⇐⇒ ∀q ∈ R+i (s),∃x ∈ RN−i(q) 3 x -i s∧∀h ∈
R+i (x) 3 h -i s.
A resolution is reached when a state that is stable for all DMs is reached. Such a state
is called an equilibrium. A conflict may have more than one equilibrium.
Definition 7. s ∈ Sequilibrium ⇐⇒ s ∈ SStableN 3 SStableN = SNashN ∪ SSEQN ∪ SGMRN ∪ SSMRN .
In Table 2.1, a summary of the numbers and types of moves the focal DM considers
in the various stability concepts is given. For example, in Nash stability, the focal DM
considers only his or her own possible UIs, while in SEQ the focal DM also considers UIs
by opponents. After incorporating robustness in the stability definitions, the contents of
Table 2.1 will be extended to consider additional foresight or moves that are not necessarily
UIs.
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2.3.2 Robustness of Equilibria
Since GMCR utilizes stability principles similar to those in game theory, it is appropriate to
look at the robustness of equilibria in game theory. In GMCR, DMs make their moves and
countermoves according to relative preferences for the various states produced by different
combinations of their options. States represent possible outcomes of a round of a conflict
that takes place at a single point in time. Other stages of conflict evolution are analyzed
either separately, or jointly as one conflict over an extended time period. In game theory,
an analyst may reject certain Nash equilibria because they are counter intuitive (Fudenberg
et al., 1988). It is possible that, for any given game, agreement over which equilibria are
more stable might be “a matter of taste” (Kohlberg and Mertens, 1986). More formalized
methodologies to investigate or further restrict Nash equilibrium are proposed, including
perfect equilibrium (Selten, 1975), proper equilibrium (Myerson, 1978), strategically stable
equilibrium (Kohlberg and Mertens, 1986), and robust equilibria of potential games (Ui,
2001). The objective of equilibrium refinement and robustness in game theory is to find
the most stable, robust, or likely equilibria.
Concepts such as perfect equilibrium (Selten, 1975) and proper equilibrium (Myerson,
1978) further restrict a Nash equilibrium by imposing probabilistic weights on opponents
strategies. In a Nash equilibrium, a player is assumed to think only of his or her strategy
without considering the opponents strategies. Assigning weights to opponents’ strategies
may help to avoid unlikely Nash equilibria. Such methods in a game theory setting are
designed to maximize players’ payoffs. It is also noteworthy to mention that robustness
of an equilibrium in a game theory setting was utilized in the extensive or normal form
of games and never in the graph model. Nevertheless, the purpose of an investigation of
equilibrium robustness differ in this research in the sense that we are not interested in the
highest payoff, but want to find an equilibrium that is stable enough to be a sustainable
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resolution of conflicts.
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Chapter 3
Strategic Analysis of the Great
Canadian Hydroelectric Power
Conflict
A long-term conflict is analyzed using the original graph model. This real life example
provided the motivation for this thesis. Limitation in modelling and analysis of this conflict
inspired the methodology in Chapters 4 to 6. This chapter is largely based on three
publications by Matbouli et al. (2012a,b, 2014b).
3.1 Introduction
Canada has a great and diverse energy potential, including oil, nuclear, wind and hy-
dropower energy sources (Robinson, 1987). However, provincial conflicts could hinder the
development of Canada’s energy sector. Churchill Falls hydroelectric power is the subject
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of a prolonged controversy among politicians of two Canadian provinces: Newfoundland
and Labrador (NL), and Que´bec (QC) (Churchill, 2003; Feehan and Baker, 2007; Fee-
han, 2011; Matbouli et al., 2012a,b, 2014b). Although the long-term of the contract en-
couraged investment, it may have weakened the development of the hydroelectric energy
sector. A well-functioning national energy sector requires a cross-provincial regulator to en-
sure proper integration of resources and to avoid monopolies (Hauteclocque and Glachant,
2009).
The conflict concerns the exploitation of an enormous source of hydroelectric power,
the Churchill Falls Hydro site, one of the world largest hydroelectric generation stations
with a current capacity of more than 5400 MW (Nalcor Energy, 2011a). An additional
project, the Lower Churchill Falls, will add over 3000 MW (Nalcor Energy, 2011b). The
current Churchill Falls power exceeds twice the output of the Canadian side of Niagara
Falls, and exceeds the total output of the Niagara Falls power generation, see (Nalcor
Energy, 2011a,b; Ontario Power Generation, 2012). The Churchill Falls site is located
in the Labrador territory of NL, far from the populated areas in the province. However,
Churchill Falls is located close to the QC border, at a distance of about 180 km (Feehan
and Baker, 2007), (see Figure 3.1).
The Churchill Falls Hydroelectric power generation station is operated by Churchill
Falls Labrador Corporation (CFLCo) (Feehan and Baker, 2007), of which NL owns 65.8%
and QC the remaining 34.2%. Most of the power has been sold to QC at a low price (Hydro-
Que´bec and Churchill Falls (Labrador) Corporation Limited, 1969; Feehan and Baker, 2007;
Matbouli et al., 2012a,b, 2014b). The NL government views the contract as unfair and
unethical (Churchill, 2003; Feehan and Baker, 2007). Moreover, many Newfoundlanders
and Labradorians think of this contract as another instance where their resources are being
“exploited by outsiders” (Feehan and Baker, 2007), as the NL government cannot increase
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Figure 3.1: Churchill Falls, Gull Island, Muskrat Falls, and the Two Transmission Lines
the price to reflect the current market, nor can it reclaim any of the power for its own
use. Finally, NL cannot cancel the contract until it expires. QC, on the other hand, views
this contract as a legitimate deal, agreed upon by both sides and appropriate, given the
uncertainty in the market when it was signed.
Various NL governments challenged the agreement in many ways. NL appealed twice to
the Supreme Court of Canada (The Supreme Court of Canada, 1988a,b), which affirmed in
both cases that the contract was valid. In addition, other aspects of the conflict originate
from the initial contract and the desire of NL to develop an adjacent hydroelectric power
source, Lower Churchill Falls.
The conflict over the Churchill Falls power generation station has seen several rounds
since the 1960s. The length of this conflict reflects its very long duration-44 years, with an
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additional automatic renewal for 25 more years.
There are three main issues in the original conflict:
1. The very low price at which NL must sell energy to QC, a price that even drops after
the renewal.
2. The duration of the contract, including the renewal clause.
3. The inability of NL to reclaim energy for its own use.
The conflict is analyzed using the Graph Model for Conflict Resolution (GMCR) (Kil-
gour et al., 1987; Fang et al., 1993; Kilgour and Hipel, 2005; Hipel et al., 2011). GMCR
has been applied in the analysis of various conflicts (Savich et al., 1983; Xianpei et al.,
1988) and negotiations (Sheikhmohammady et al., 2010) and proven to provide insights on
the stability of conflicts, and the movement of each decision maker (DM) involved. The
systematic approach of GMCR has been applied to the Great Canadian Hydroelectric con-
flict in order to understand how it affected the development of the Churchill Falls project
and its impact on the further development of the remaining hydropower potentials of the
Churchill river.
The study of this conflict has important lessons for policy making. It provides insights
into the problems associated with long-term contracts and their effect on the public interest.
The lengthy duration of the contract even exceeds what is suggested for long-term take-
or-pay contracts (Johnston et al., 2008).
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3.2 History and Background
NL is Canada’s newest province. Soon after joining Canada in 1949, the government of NL
aimed to boost its economy up to the level of other provinces. In 1953 (Feehan and Baker,
2007), with the help of British industrialists and bankers, the NL government established
the British Newfoundland Development Corporation (Brinco) (Smith, 1975), in order to
develop industrial opportunities in the province. The land and water rights leased by the
NL government to Brinco for a 99 year term included the hydroelectric potential of the
waterfalls on the upper reaches of the Churchill River, formerly known as the Hamilton
River and renamed in 1965 (Feehan and Baker, 2007).
In 1958, in order to develop and operate the Upper Churchill Falls hydroelectric project
(Matbouli et al., 2012a,b, 2014b), Brinco established a federally incorporated subsidiary
called the Hamilton Falls Power Company and later renamed Churchill Falls (Labrador)
Corporation (CFLCo) (Feehan and Baker, 2007; Smith, 1975). Shawinigan Engineering,
a private engineering firm based in QC, purchased a 20% stake in CFLCo. Referencing
CFLCo and Brinco is interchangeable, and some executives held positions in both compa-
nies (Feehan, 2011).
The purpose of the development of the Upper Churchill Falls project was to sell en-
ergy in the adjacent province of QC and beyond, more specifically, to Ontario-Hydro and
Consolidated Edison Company of New York (Feehan, 2011); Figure 3.1 shows potential
buyers and routes in Canada and the United States. In order for CFLCo to undertake the
development and secure finances, it had to transmit electricity from the generation site
to buyers. It had two alternatives: either transmit power through QC using a relatively
short and economical transmission line (see Figure 3.1), or undertake a challenging and fi-
nancially unattractive transmission line on what is known as the Maritimes route (Feehan,
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2011) or the Anglo-Saxon route (Feehan and Baker, 2007), transmitting power through
two subsea cables, from Labrador to the island of Newfoundland and then to Nova Scotia
and from there to the rest of Canada and the United States.
3.2.1 Contract Negotiations
Because the Upper Churchill Falls hydropower project is huge and beyond the local market
needs in NL, Brinco had to provide a long-term sale agreement in order to secure finances
for the project (Feehan, 2011). Brinco considered selling power to Hydro-Que´bec, Ontario-
Hydro, and Consolidated Edison Company of New York (Feehan, 2011) by transmitting
power via QC. In 1962, QC started a provincial nationalization process of its private electric
utility companies, which resulted in forcing Shawinigan Engineering to sell its share in
CFLCo, which came under the control of Hydro-Que´bec (Feehan, 2011). After serious
negotiations between Brinco, through its subsidiary CFLCo, and Hydro-Que´bec started
in 1963, it became apparent to Brinco that transmitting power through QC to interested
buyers elsewhere was an almost infeasible option (Feehan and Baker, 2007). QC refused to
grant Brinco the right-of-way to transmit power via QC. Instead, QC offered to buy all the
power generated at the Upper Churchill Falls hydroelectric site at the border point. Under
this condition, Brinco and NL considered avoiding the QC route altogether and funded a
study to examine the possibility of transmitting power via the Maritimes route (Feehan,
2011). Although the Maritimes route was technically feasible, it was uneconomical (Feehan
and Baker, 2007; Feehan, 2011). Then the negotiations moved toward an agreement in
which CFLCo would sell the power on a long-term basis to Hydro-Que´bec. In 1966, after
difficult negotiations (Feehan, 2011), an extensive letter of intent between CFLCo and
Hydro-Que´bec was signed (Feehan and Baker, 2007).
Although some preparation and light construction work began in 1963, the year 1966
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marks the official launch of substantial construction of the site (Feehan and Baker, 2007;
Feehan, 2011). Meanwhile, funds started flowing into the project, in anticipation of the final
and definitive agreement between CFLCo and Que´bec Hydro-Electric Commission (Hydro-
Que´bec and Churchill Falls (Labrador) Corporation Limited, 1969). The move by QC to
nationalize Hydro-Que´bec and Shawinigan Engineering, brought the Government of QC
into both sides of the negotiation, as it was both a seller and buyer. When the Government
of QC took over the management of Shawinigan Engineering, it gained an insider view of
the negotiations because it would see the challenges facing CFLCo, which provided an
advantage to the Government of QC. Some concerns were raised by Brinco whether this
move had a conflict of interest, which was partially remediated in the negotiations by
inviting the NL government to purchase 8% stake in CFLCo (Feehan and Baker, 2007).
QC’s stronger position in the negotiations resulted in changes to the terms of the letter
of intent signed earlier by both parties. The QC government, represented by Hydro-Que´bec,
moved slowly towards a definitive contract, resulting in financial disaster for CFLCo, as
money stopped flowing into the ongoing construction, and the company was unable to pay
its bills (Feehan and Baker, 2007).
A deal described as “do or die” by the CEO of CFLCo (Feehan and Baker, 2007) was
reached. This definitive contract, signed in 1969, caused great difficulties for CFLCo. The
duration of the contract was extended from the initial proposal of 30 or 35 years to 44
years, with an automatic renewal clause; previously, only mutually agreed-upon renewal
was possible (Feehan and Baker, 2007). A few years later, as part of its protest against
the contract, the NL government purchased all shares of Brinco in CFLCo and became a
direct player with QC in the Churchill Falls Project. Today, although the NL government
owns about two-thirds of CFLCo, the QC government represented by Hydro-Que´bec earns
about 50 times the NL government does from selling electricity (Feehan and Baker, 2007).
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Hydro-Que´bec buys electricity at about $2.5 per MW and exports it at an average rate
exceeding $80 per MW (Feehan and Baker, 2007).
3.2.2 Contract Re-Negotiations and Appeals to the Supreme
Court of Canada
In the early 1970s, the NL government expressed its dissatisfaction with the contract
signed between CFLCo and Hydro-Que´bec. From the early 1970s to the late 1980s, the
NL government made several attempts to rectify the deal, including:
1. Purchasing Brinco’s share in CFLCo to gain direct control of CFLCo. CFLCo has
two owners: NL (65.8%) and QC (34.2%),
2. Requesting re-negotiating of the contract with QC,
3. Appealing to the Canadian Public,
4. Appealing to the Supreme Court of Canada,
5. Creating the “Upper Churchill Water Rights Reversion Act” to reclaim some of the
energy produced.
However, all of these attempts were unsuccessful. QC refused to re-negotiate the contract,
and the Supreme Court of Canada affirmed twice that the contract was valid (The Supreme
Court of Canada, 1988a,b). Moreover, the Supreme Court of Canada overruled a new act
that the NL government tried to impose (The Supreme Court of Canada, 1984).
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3.2.3 The Lower Churchill Falls Project
Beginning in 2003, the NL government put further effort into hydroelectric power develop-
ment in order to exploit the remaining potential of the Churchill River water resources at
Gull Island and Muskrat Falls (see Figure 3.1), leading to the Lower Churchill Falls project
that is currently under development. The existing Upper Churchill Falls generation station
harnesses about 65% of the potential of the Churchill River (Nalcor Energy, 2011b). The
Lower Churchill Falls Project aims to harness the remaining 35% (Nalcor Energy, 2011b),
adding more than 3000 MW to existing production and bringing the total production when
Lower Churchill Falls is completed to 8500 MW. In order to achieve this, two new installa-
tions are planned at Gull Island and Muskrat Falls. For the Lower Churchill Falls project,
NL was eager to secure a financially viable agreement and to avoid the mistakes of the
Upper Churchill Falls contract. NL filed an application to use QC transmission facilities,
which was later rejected (Government of Newfoundland and Labrador, 2010). It contested
the rejection in a QC court but was unsuccessful (Premier Danny Williams, 2010; Gov-
ernment of Newfoundland and Labrador, 2010). The federal government intervened and
backed the NL proposal to secure finances for the Maritimes route, which is now the main
option NL is undertaking (CBC News, 2011).
3.2.4 Contract Automatic Renewal in 2016
In 2016, the contract for the Upper Churchill Falls is due for an automatic 25-year renewal,
which is expected to cause a new conflict between NL and QC (Feehan and Baker, 2007).
The automatic renewal clause is unexplainable (Feehan and Baker, 2007): there is no jus-
tification given in the contract. The NL government will very likely challenge it, especially
because it sets the prices even lower than the initial contract, and may therefore result in
25
long-term financial losses (Feehan and Baker, 2007). In fact, the new price may not be
enough to cover the operational expenses of the project (Feehan and Baker, 2007).
3.2.5 The Labrador Boundary Dispute
It is noteworthy that the borders of the Labrador territory of NL were a subject of dispute
with Canada before NL became a province. Churchill Falls lies in what used to be the
disputed zone between QC, represented by the Federal Government of Canada, and the
Dominion of Newfoundland. The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council settled that
dispute in favour of Newfoundland in 1927 (Judicial Committee of Great Britain Privy
Council, 1927; McEwen, 1982). However, during the negotiations between NL and QC in
regard to the development of Upper Churchill Falls, QC brought the issue to the table and
suggested a resolution based on a territorial exchange, but this was not considered further
because NL refused to negotiate such a resolution (Feehan, 2011).
3.2.6 Canadian Electricity Policy in Relation to Churchill Falls
Development
Churchill Falls development was encouraged in 1962 when the federal government allowed
export of electricity from Canada, which made Consolidated Edison Company of New York
an interesting option for Brinco (Feehan, 2011). However, when NL investigated the pos-
sibility of using QC land to transmit power to interested buyers, QC indicated that their
interest would be possible only if QC purchase all the power at the border and have the
right to resell it at market price (Feehan, 2011). It has been argued that QC’s denial of
the right of way to NL was unconstitutional according to Section 92.10 (a) of the British
North America Act of 1867 in which the federal government has jurisdiction over any “Un-
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dertakings connecting the Province with any other or others of the Provinces, or extending
beyond the limit of the Province” (Department of Justice, Canada, 1983; Feehan, 2011).
NL claims that the federal government placed Hydro-Que´bec in a “monopolistic” position
in the negotiations by failing to enact Section 92.10 (a) of the constitution (Churchill,
2003). On the other hand, as per Section 92.13 of the Constitution Act, QC should have
jurisdiction over its property rights (Department of Justice, Canada, 1983; Feehan, 2011).
In 1959, the federal government created The National Energy Board (NEB) which did not
cover inter-provincial control of electricity (Feehan, 2011).
3.3 Conflict Model
The Churchill Falls conflict is a long-term conflict (Matbouli et al., 2013a) that has seen
many changes. The decision makers (DMs), their options, and their preferences have
changed over the course of the conflict. To model the conflict systematically, it is divided
into four main phases, based mainly on time; there are two historical conflicts, one current
conflict, and one future conflict (see timeline in Figure 3.2):
• Phase 1. Contract Negotiations (1963-1969): The contract negotiations can be di-
vided into two rounds:
1. Before the signing of the letter of intent (1963-1966): During this period initial
proposals were exchanged between CFLCo and Hydro-Que´bec. The focus is to
show the evolution of their conflict.
2. After the letter of intent and before the final contract was signed (1966-1969): In
this period, there were significant changes to the original proposals, including the
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Figure 3.2: Timeline Showing the Four Phases of the Conflict
automatic renewal clause and changes in DMs, options and conflict of interest
issues, as well as an extension of the duration of the contract.
• Phase 2. Recall of Power and Price Re-Negotiation (1971-1988): In the early 1970s,
the NL government expressed dissatisfaction over the contract leading to the second
conflict. In this period, there were important changes in DMs and options.
• Phase 3. Lower Churchill Project (2003-2011): Although the circumstances of the
Lower Churchill Project are similar to the Upper Churchill Project, the development
and contracts are different. DMs and options were similar, but a third party inter-
vener played a more important role, changing the outcome. Moreover, the experience
with the old contract improved the strategies of the players.
• Phase 4. The automatic renewal (2016):(Feehan, 2011) This is expected to take place
in the near future (Feehan and Baker, 2007). A model should consider a number of
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possible scenarios and whether third party intervention could prevent an escalation
of the conflict.
3.3.1 The First Conflict: Contract Negotiations
Before signing the letter of intent
During the early phases of contract negotiations, almost everything was possible. The DMs
discovered new opportunities with the many options on the table, opportunities that were
reduced in the second phase. DMs in this stage were:
1. Brinco and Partners: Brinco led the first phase of negotiations when it proposed the
project to Hydro-Que´bec and financing institutions. The Brinco partners were repre-
sented in CFLCo and its shareholder Shawinigan Engineering. Brinco, CFLCo, and
Shawinigan Engineering had similar options and acted as one player in the negotia-
tion stage. The NL government had some contact with Brinco and QC government
during the negotiations (Feehan, 2011) but did not play a substantial role (Feehan
and Baker, 2007). The options available to Brinco and its partners include:
• Transmit electricity via QC to buyers elsewhere,
• Transmit electricity via the Maritimes route to buyers elsewhere,
• Sell power to QC, or
• Cancel the development.
2. Hydro-Que´bec: This privately owned company was pleased with the opportunity to
take part in the Upper Churchill Project. It had the option of accepting proposals
or delaying until more lucrative terms were reached.
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Table 3.1: Decision Makers and Options in the Contract Negotiations before 1966
DMs Options
Brinco and Partners in CFLCo
QC route
Maritimes route
Sell power to QC
Cancel the development
Hydro-Que´bec
Sign
Delay
Investors Finance
3. Financing Institutions: They would finance or not depending on the deal. These
institutions wanted an economically viable project that would ensure them an ac-
ceptable return on their investment.
See Table 3.1 for a summary of DMs and options.
After signing the letter of intent
Important changes in the players and options shaped this phase preceding the signing of a
definitive contract. QC nationalized its hydroelectric companies, including Hydro-Que´bec
and Shawinigan Engineering. This change put the QC government on both sides of the
table: with Brinco as a partner in CFLCo replacing Shawinigan Engineering, and as a
buyer on the side of Hydro-Que´bec. Inside Brinco, this change was perceived to create
a conflict of interest, which was partially remediated by inviting the NL government to
purchase a small share in CFLCo. However, QC was able to see the perspective of the
seller as well as the buyer, giving it a great advantage in the negotiations. At this stage,
it became clear that transmitting the power via the Maritimes route was not welcomed by
the financing institutions, and QC rejected the proposal to use its own route to transmit
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Table 3.2: Option Form for Contract Negotiations after 1966
DMs Options
Brinco and Partners in CFLCo
Sell power to QC
Cancel the development
Hydro-Que´bec
Sign
Delay
Investors Finance
energy owned by NL to other buyers. Brinco and its partners realized that their options
had shrunk to only two: either sell the generated power to QC, or cancel the development.
Brinco could not afford to cancel. CFLCo started construction immediately after signing
the letter of intent and came under pressure to sign the final agreement with QC in order
to continue receiving money from investors. QC used this situation to its advantage and
delayed signing the final deal for three years, until Brinco, represented by CFLCo was
prepared to accept any terms in order to expedite the process. At this time, the automatic
renewal clause came into the deal as an addition to the extended duration. See Table 3.2
for a summary of players and options.
Preferences
Brinco and its partners preferred to have cheap access to an open market. This is possible
by transmitting power through QC and exporting energy to the highest bidders, potentially,
in the US. Brinco also did not want the project to be called off since it was in financial
distress and needed this project to continue. The Maritimes route is favoured if and only
if investors agree to finance it and QC refuses to permit the use of its transmission lines.
These preferences changed after the signing of the letter of intent when it became clear
to Brinco that the only available option other than calling off the development was to
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sell power to QC. QC, on the other hand, saw an attractive opportunity in the deal only
if power was sold to it. However, Brinco choosing the Maritimes route is less preferred
than cancelling the development to Hydro-Que´bec. The investors and financial institutions
prefer to finance the project, but only when an attractive deal is in place. Their view of
an attractive and financially viable deal requires that either Brinco reaches an agreement
with Hydro-Que´bec to transmit electricity via QC transmission lines, or that it sells the
power to QC.
3.3.2 The Second Conflict: Recall of Power and Price
Re-Negotiation
After the contract was settled, NL quickly expressed dissatisfaction and claimed the deal
was unfair and unethical. Its dissatisfaction spread through media to the public. Two
challenges ruled on by the Supreme Court of Canada both affirmed that the contract was
valid (The Supreme Court of Canada, 1988a,b). These attempts introduced the Supreme
Court as a player in the conflict. Other players included the QC government and Hydro-
Que´bec, NL government, and CFLCo. Table 3.3 lists the players, and their options are
presented in what is called option form.
3.3.3 The Third Conflict: The Lower Churchill Falls Project
Although the Lower Churchill Falls project may seem similar to the first contract negotia-
tions, an important third party intervention changed the conflict. The Federal Government
of Canada intervened and backed loans to the NL government to secure finances for the
Maritimes route, which in the past had been considered uneconomical by financing in-
stitutions. See Figure 3.1 for the Maritimes Route. This game-changer greatly affected
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Table 3.3: Decision Makers and Options for Recall of Power and Price Re-Negotiation—
DMs Options
Gov. of NL
1-Appeal to the Canadian Public (Media)
2-Call on the federal government for intervention
(Intervention)
3-Appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada (Appeal)
4-Invoke the water rights reversion act (Water Act)
Gov. of QC
1-Accept renegotiation of the contract (Accept)
2-Appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada against
the water reversion act (Appeal)
Supreme Court of
Canada
1-Modify the contract (Modify)
2-Accept the water rights reversion act (Accept)
the outcome of the third conflict. The new option provided the NL government with a
stronger position when negotiating the terms with any potential buyer of energy including
QC. Furthermore, having the Maritimes transmission line in place when the automatic
renewal is due may motivate NL to threaten to break the deal with QC. The players and
their options are listed in Table 3.4.
3.3.4 The Fourth Conflict: Automatic Renewal Clause
In 2016, it is likely that the NL government will invite QC to sit at the negotiation table
again to reconsider the automatic renewal clause (Feehan and Baker, 2007). This attempt
will likely take a similar path to the Supreme Court of Canada. The renewal clause was not
discussed at the time of the second conflict (Feehan and Baker, 2007). Hence, the conflict
probably will have three main players: the NL government, the QC government, and the
Supreme Court of Canada. Another scenario is also possible. The federal government
could intervene as it did in the third conflict, which may have an impact on the course of
the conflict. The possible options for each potential player are shown in Table 3.5.
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Table 3.4: Decision Makers and Options for the Lower Churchill Falls Project
Players Options
Gov. of NL
QC route
Maritimes route
Sell power to QC
Cancel the development
Gov. of QC
Sign
Delay
Investors Finance
Federal Government Back investment
Table 3.5: Decision Makers and Options for Future Dispute (2016) on Automatic Renewal
Clause of Upper Churchill Falls
Players Options
Gov. of NL
1-Appeal to the Canadian Public (Media)
2-Call on the federal government for intervention
(Intervention)
3-Appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada (Appeal)
Gov. of QC
1-Accept breaking of the contract
2-Modify price of renewal period
Supreme Court of
Canada
1-Break the contract
2-Modify the contract
Federal
Government
1-Insist on a resolution
2-Subsidize NL’s losses
3-Subsidize QC’s losses
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3.4 Conflict Analysis: Contract Negotiations
(1963-1969)
The Great Canadian Hydroelectric Power Conflict is indeed a very complex ongoing conflict
that evolved over a long time. For the scope of this Chapter, only the Contract Negotiations
are analyzed. The two phases of Contract Negotiations will be analyzed separately here.
The differences between the two contract-negotiation phases that took place during the
conflict are shown in Table 3.6.
Table 3.6: Players and Options of the Two Phases of Contract Negotiations
Before 1966 After 1966
DMs & Options DMs & Options
1. Brinco, CFLCo, Shawinigan Eng.
• Maritimes Route
• Transmit via QC
• Sell to QC
• Call off the development
2. Hydro-Que´bec, QC Gov
• Sign
• Delay
3. Investors
• Finance
1. Brinco and QC Gov
• Sell to QC
• Call off the development
2. QC Gov, Hydro-Que´bec, and
(Shawinigan Eng.)
• Sign
• Delay
3. Investors
• Finance
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Table 3.7: Contract Negotiations before 1966
DMs Options Outcomes
States 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Brinco
TVQC Y N N Y N N Y N N Y N N
Maritimes N N Y N N N N N Y N N N
STQC N Y N N Y N N Y N N Y N
Call off N N N N N Y N N N N N Y
Preference Ranking 7  8  9  11  10  12  6  1 ∼ 2 ∼ 3 ∼ 4 ∼ 5
Hydro-Que´bec
Sign Y Y N N N N Y Y N N N N
Delay N N Y Y Y Y N N Y Y Y Y
Preference Ranking 8  2  3 ∼ 4  6  5 ∼ 11  10 ∼ 12  1 ∼ 7  9
Investors Finance N N N N N N Y Y Y Y Y Y
Preference Ranking 7 ∼ 8  1 ∼ 2  3 ∼ 4 ∼ 5 ∼ 6 ∼ 10  9 ∼ 11  12
Note TVQC Transmit via QC
Maritimes Maritimes Route
STQC Sell to QC
3.4.1 Before Signing the Letter of Intent (1963-1966)
The negotiations prior to the signing of the letter of intent are presented in Table 3.7. Only
logically infeasible states were removed from the set of possible states in order to avoid
false equilibria. The conflict was analyzed using the GMCR II decision support system
(Hipel et al., 1997) and resulted in the equilibria shown in Table 3.8.
During the negotiations there were four equilibria at states 7, 8, 9, and 6. The equilib-
rium states show that all options available to Brinco are consistent with possible equilibria.
As the negotiations move to the signing of the letter of intent, Brinco realizes that its op-
tions have shrunk to only two, leading to the second phase of the negotiations.
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Table 3.8: Equilibria States for Contract Negotiations before 1966
Brinco
TVQC Y N N N
Maritimes N N Y N
STQC N Y N N
Call off N N N Y
Hydro-Que´bec
Sign Y Y N N
Delay N N Y Y
Investors
Finance Y Y Y N
State Number 7 8 9 6
Note
TVQC Transmit via QC
Maritimes Maritimes Route
STQC Sell to QC
3.4.2 From the Letter of Intent to the Final Contract (1966-1969)
Phase 2 of contract negotiations was reached only after Brinco realized its real options.
The project could be developed only by reaching an agreement to sell Hydro-Que´bec the
energy. Otherwise, Brinco will be forced to cancel the development, which it greatly prefers
to avoid. See Table 3.9 for the graph model options and possible outcomes. Movement
from the status quo state to the only equilibrium is shown in Table 3.10, which indicates
that, in the intermediate stage, Hydro-Que´bec delayed signing the deal until it met its
terms, taking advantage of QC’s knowledge of Brinco’s weak financial position.
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Table 3.9: Contract Negotiations after 1966
Players Options Outcomes
States 1 2 3 4
Brinco
Sell Y Y N Y
Call off N N Y N
Preference Ranking 4  1  2  3
Hydro-Que´bec
Sign Y N N Y
Delay N Y Y N
Preference Ranking 4  1  2  3
Investors Finance N N N Y
Preference Ranking 4  1 ∼ 2 ∼ 3
Table 3.10: How Negotiations Moved toward Equilibrium (Y: Yes, N: No)
DMs and Options Status Quo Transitional State Equilibrium
Brinco
Sell Y Y Y
Call off N N N
Hydro-Que´bec
Sign N =⇒ Y Y
Delay Y =⇒ N Y
Investors
Finance N N =⇒ Y
3.5 Sensitivity Analysis: Contract Negotiations
The objective of sensitivity analysis is to ascertain whether the outcome of the analysis
was robust or susceptible to changes based on a simple variation of the parameters of the
conflict, which in principle includes players, options, or preferences. Sensitivity analysis is
often called “what-if” analysis. Reasonable scenarios to explore include “what if Brinco
were not in financial despair”, and “what if the NL government guaranteed financing of
any option that Brinco decided to take”. Others include “what if the Federal Government
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had intervened to change the preferences of Hydro-Que´bec, or had introduced legislation
covering inter-provincial power transmission”. It is obvious that other possible scenarios
could have resulted in different outcomes compared what actually took place.
3.5.1 What If Brinco were Financially Secure?
Assume that Brinco is financially secure, perhaps, because the NL government backed its
loans, or investors saw a real opportunity, poured money into the company, and trusted
its moves. Brinco would have had a stronger negotiating position, and more freedom in
making its choices. The graph model would cover the new Negotiation Conflict in Table
3.11.
Table 3.12 shows how new equilibria would evolve. Beginning in state 4, Brinco will
approach Hydro-Que´bec to secure a deal to transmit power via Hydro-Que´bec transmission
lines to buyers elsewhere. Hydro-Que´bec would refuse, and then Brinco will move toward
its second preference, which is to build the Maritimes transmission line. This is a Nash
equilibrium for Brinco, which Hydro-Que´bec cannot affect on its own. The result is state
3, a new equilibrium that differs from what took place in the original conflict. In fact, this
development reflects the situation in 2011 with the Lower Churchill Falls development,
when NL was able to secure financing from the Federal Government that backed its loans,
despite objections from QC (CBC News, 2011).
3.6 Third Party Intervention: Contract Negotiations
Could this conflict have been resolved by third party intervention? This section will explore
how the Federal Government could play a positive role in obtaining a resolution fair to both
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Table 3.11: Contract Negotiations with Brinco in Good Finances
Players Options Outcomes
States 1 2 3 4 5 6
Brinco
TVQC Y N N Y N N
Maritimes N N Y N N N
STQC N Y N N Y N
Call off N N N N N Y
Preference Ranking 1  3  2  4 ∼ 5 ∼ 6
Hydro-Que´bec
Sign Y Y N N N N
Delay N N Y Y Y Y
Preference Ranking 5  2  3 ∼ 4 ∼ 6  1
Note TVQC Transmit via QC
Maritimes Maritimes Route
STQC Sell to QC
Table 3.12: Moving toward Equilibria when Brinco is in Good Finances
Players & Options
Brinco
TVQC Y =⇒ N
Maritimes N =⇒ Y
STQC N =⇒ N
Call off N =⇒ N
Hydro-Que´bec
Sign N =⇒ N
Delay Y =⇒ Y
State Number 4 =⇒ 3
Note
TVQC Transmit via QC
Maritimes Maritimes Route
STQC Sell to QC
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parties, perhaps even during the negotiation of the initial contract. Using value-focused
thinking (Keeney, 1992), the Federal Government could help NL and QC reach a resolution
they both prefer.
Valuing Canada as one nation and protecting the interest of the general public is part
of the Federal Government’s role. Taking this value into consideration, the Federal Gov-
ernment would prefer a resolution in which free access to markets is granted to every
province. Moreover, the Federal Government values cooperative projects that enhance
intra-provincial ties and strengthen local economic growth that benefits all provinces.
Such an outcome could have been achieved if the Federal Government had mediated to
bridge the gap between the two provinces and helped them reach an agreement acceptable
in the eyes of both Que´beckers and the Newfoundlanders and Labradorians. In order that
every party realizes benefits from the contract, NL must earn money selling its clean energy
to QC, which QC can sell as a clean energy source to American customers. Moreover,
letting NL sell excess energy to other buyers would bring earnings from the transmission
charges to support upgrading and further developing QC’s transmission lines.
3.7 Lessons Learned, Insights, and Conclusions
Analysis shows that some causes of the Great Canadian Hydroelectric Power Conflict still
exist, but can be mitigated through regulations that empower the energy sector. For
example, regulating risk exposure (Willems and Corte, 2008) could incentivize investments
to fund energy projects, which would reduce the need for extremely long-term contracts.
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3.7.1 Lessons Learned and Insights
The following points summarize the lessons learned from the contract negotiations events
while drawing some insights:
• As a board member and a significant shareholder of Brinco, QC was privy to im-
portant information concerning Brinco. This exposure weakened Brinco’s position in
the negotiations,
• The delay in signing the deal forced Brinco to accept all terms and conditions,
• Uncertainty played against Brinco when investors refused to fund anything other
than selling or transmitting power via QC,
• While the contract price was legitimate, as later ruled by the Supreme Court of
Canada, the duration, and the automatic renewal clause are questionable,
• The 99 years lease of water and land rights from NL government to Brinco should
have contained conditions in regard to income generation to avoid lousy contracts,
• Brinco should have pushed for the option of transmitting power through QC to other
buyers, using legal options based on Canadian law,
• There was no third party intervener, which could have helped to reach a more equi-
table solution.
3.7.2 Conclusions
In conclusion, it seems that the hydroelectric power conflict examined in this chapter is
likely to continue unless an intervener enters the game and works out a resolution that
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satisfies both parties, based, for example, on a value-focused thinking (Keeney, 1992). In-
tervention is urgently needed because plans for the development of the expensive Maritimes
transmission line, which includes two subsea cables, are ongoing. These resources could
be better-directed toward expanding and maintaining the current QC transmission line.
Finally, policies and regulations should be introduced or amended to protect the public
interest in long-term contracts, such as the one between Hydro-Que´bec and CFLCo. Rec-
ommended further research includes the analysis of the future conflict in 2016 as well as
carrying out uncertainty analysis of preferences and options.
3.8 Chapter Summary
The contract negotiation that led to the 1969 agreement between NL, and Quebec, is
systemically analyzed within the framework of Graph Model for Conflict Resolution. The
Great Canadian Hydroelectric Power Conflict has been ongoing since 1963 and shows no
signs of ending. In this dispute, the Province of Quebec has the right to buy almost all
of the power generated from the Upper Churchill Falls, which is located in the Labrador
territory in NL, at a very low price. Originally, the contract was signed by Churchill Falls
Labrador Corporation to secure finances for the Upper Churchill Falls development. The
unpopularity of the contract led to several unsuccessful attempts by the NL Government to
escape its provisions. NL is currently negotiating to develop the Lower Churchill Project
and seeking to avoid the mistakes of the first contract. Furthermore, the automatic renewal
clause of the original contract is expected to cause another round of conflict in 2016.
The analysis shows that, given the circumstances in which the agreement was signed, the
outcome was almost inevitable. A third party intervener rule could have remediated the
damage caused by the conflict.
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Chapter 4
Characterization of a Conflict
This chapter is largely based on two publications by Matbouli et al. (2013a, 2014d), which
provide suggestions on how to capture key information of a real life conflict in order to
use it in a model. It also highlights important features that connect several conflicts to
one. In addition, an enhanced representation of the Graph Model for Conflict Resolution
(GMCR) is proposed to show decision makers’ preferences on the graph.
4.1 Introduction
Characterization of conflict modes and parameters in order to facilitate the recognition of
an original conflict is proposed. Long-term conflicts that tend to evolve over time take
place in several rounds, and in order to connect the rounds and attribute them to one
conflict, characterization of a conflict is introduced. In modes of a conflict, the activity
cycle in which a conflict takes place is presented. Parameters of conflicts are identified in
terms of decision makers, objectives, options, and status quo. Then, using an enhanced
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graph model, a new way of representing preferences on the graph is outlined. Finally, an
illustrative example is given for the Great Canadian Hydroelectric Power conflict.
4.2 Characterization Categories
A review of conflict theory in literature is presented in Section 2.1. Characterization of
conflicts is divided into three categories: modes of a conflict, macro versus micro conflict,
and parameters of a conflict. Each category is explained in the following sections.
4.2.1 Modes of a conflict
Modes of conflicts describe the activity conditions of a conflict. In this section, three conflict
modes are defined: incipient, active, and dormant. The recognition that a conflict passes
through stages facilitates its analysis, even before it occurs. In some situations, conflict
conditions exist even though there are no moves. Figure 4.1 indicates that a conflict starts
in the incipient mode; then, when moves start, it becomes active. After a set of moves and
countermoves, the conflict may reach an equilibrium. If this equilibrium is sustainable,
then the conflict is considered resolved. However, if this equilibrium is temporary, the
conflict becomes dormant for a period of time before a new move is initiated, which causes
the conflict to become active again.
Incipient Conflict
An incipient conflict is a conflict that has not yet become active, meaning no moves have
taken place. This happens when conflicting goals exist, or scarcities of shared resources are
predicted. For instance, where a water body is shared among a number of beneficiaries,
45
Incipient Conflict Active Conflict
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Figure 4.1: Modes of Conflict
water conflicts can be expected when a DM pollutes the environment and other affected
DMs can be expected to react once the pollution is discovered and associated risks are
understood. During an incipient mode, goal realization takes place, options are discovered,
and interested actors prepare to intervene.
Active Conflict
A conflict is considered active as soon as the first move is made, when the status quo is chal-
lenged. Moves and countermoves take place during an active conflict until an equilibrium
is reached. The first move, which challenges the status quo, is an important component of
this stage, because it indicates the baseline motivation of the interested DM. Therefore, if a
future round of the conflict results in a situation that is no more preferred to the initiator,
the conflict can be expected to continue.
Dormant Conflict
After a conflict reaches a temporary equilibrium, it is considered dormant until a move
challenges the equilibrium. The difference between an incipient and dormant conflict is
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that a conflict in incipient mode has not yet started, while a dormant mode occurs between
rounds of a conflict that has already started.
4.2.2 Macro versus Micro Conflict
Another important aspect of conflict characterization is the level at which the intended
conflict is investigated. For example, the Second World War took place between the two
main parties: the Allies and the Axis. But, an analyst may be interested in a specific
confrontation between two or more forces, in a more specific time or place. The level at
which a conflict is to be analyzed should be defined clearly, whether it is the highest macro
level of the conflict or a micro conflict where small details matter. For the purpose of
conflict evolution, the macro level of a conflict is more important than the micro level.
An analyst may be interested in the micro level of a conflict in order to study tactical
responses of DMs in a conflict, but for resolution purposes, the macro level of the conflict
would better illustrate the main options and available moves leading to a resolution.
4.2.3 Parameters of a Conflict
A conflict involves two or more DMs. Each DM can select options to enhance or preserve
his or her interest. There are a number of parameters that characterize a specific conflict.
Decision Makers (DMs)
DMs represent an important parameter of conflicts, which happen as a result of DM inter-
actions. The features of the DMs that characterize a conflict include:
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1. Level of interest or involvement of DM : DMs have various degrees of involvement in
a conflict. Some DMs are more directly involved and have a more vital interest in the
outcomes of the conflict. Any DM with an interest at stake is considered a DM in the
conflict. Other DMs, such as third-party interveners (Lewicki et al., 1992; Charness
et al., 2008), may play a significant role in shaping the outcome of a conflict without
necessarily being directly affected by the results. A third-party intervener may be
disinterested in a conflict but act to resolve the conflict because of its designated role.
For example, a federal government is responsible to intervene in conflicts among local
governments. Another example is when a third-party intervener’s interest is to avoid
the consequences of escalation between neighbouring countries.
2. First move: Insights can be gained by identifying the DM who makes the first move
away from an incipient conflict. This DM is motivated to start the conflict, which
presumably will not be resolved until his or her motivation to change the situation is
reduced. The first move implies that if the resulting equilibrium is equally preferred
to the status quo that was initially challenged, it is unsustainable. Also, the first
move provides baseline information for a conflict by identifying a proactive DM with
enough interest to engage in a conflict.
3. Proactive (Initiator) and reactive: Since conflicts are analyzed in terms of moves
and countermoves, it is logical to think of DMs as being proactive and reactive. A
proactive DM takes an option that is independent of others. A countermove is a
reaction, and the responding DM is reactive.
4. Preferences of a DM : A DM starts a conflict because he or she prefers a different
state. The preferences of a DM may or may not be changed if the conflict evolves.
Changes in preferences could be caused by changes in attitudes and emotions, which
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may change from one conflict round to another. Attitudes (Inohara and Hipel, 2008b;
Bernath Walker et al., 2009) and emotions (Obeidi et al., 2005) have an impact on
DM perceptions, which affect preferences.
5. Change in DMs : DMs can be a unique feature of a conflict, and usually a change
in DMs means a different conflict. However, there are some situations where DMs
may change, yet the conflict remains the same, such as a third-party intervention
(Lewicki et al., 1992; Charness et al., 2008) which was absent in the first round and
exists in the second. Also, a DM may act on behalf of other interested individuals,
for instance when one government is replaced by another that is more attuned to the
interests of the people.
For conflicts evolving over time, some of the characteristics mentioned above for DMs may
or may not change. DMs are the centre of any conflict. The stability and resolution of
a conflict occur when a state that is stable for all DMs is reached. Changes over time in
DMs’ positions are uncertain. However, characterizing a DM could provide insights about
future positions.
Objectives
Objectives are unique characteristics of a conflict. The ultimate objective of DMs in a
conflict is to maximize their interest share or minimize the damage to their interest. The
area of specific interest of a conflict is considered a distinguishing feature. For instance,
a conflict over shares of a specific water body is defined by that water body’s name. In
future, if new rounds of conflict evolve in regard to the same issue, they can be attributed
to the initial conflict.
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Options
Options are the part of conflict resolution where DMs actually make decisions. These
decisions are based on alternatives available for DMs. Considering short and far sight,
DMs take the options that put them in positions they prefer more than existing conditions,
whether that be the status quo or an intermediate state in the conflict. Also, options
represent the steps that a DM takes in order to achieve his or her ultimate goal. Rounds
of conflicts evolve when new options become available that did not exist before, or when
attitudes change toward tolerating more aggressive options.
Status Quo
The status quo is a unique feature of a conflict. It could provide the proof that a specific
round of a conflict is a continuation of the first round. This can be checked by looking at
the most recent equilibrium; if the new round starts where the previous conflict ended, it
means these two conflicts are connected (see Figures 4.2 and 4.3). Furthermore, the status
quo gives an idea about the situation of a particular issue that is to be challenged by DMs.
Therefore, a new status quo describing the conditions that existed before a new round of
a conflict started provides valuable information about dissatisfaction of DMs.
Status Quo 
Status Quo 
Status Quo 
Status Quo  
of Round 2 
Equilibrium Equilibrium 
Equilibrium 
 of Round 1 Equilibrium 
Conflict 1 Conflict 2 
Round 1 Round 2 
Figure 4.2: Different Conflicts
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Status Quo 
Status Quo 
Status Quo 
Status Quo  
of Round 2 
Equilibrium Equilibrium 
Equilibrium 
 of Round 1 Equilibrium 
Conflict 1 Conflict 2 
Round 1 Round 2 
Figure 4.3: Connected Rounds of the Same Evolving Conflict
4.3 Representing Conflict Parameters in the Graph
Model
There are a number of ways to model conflicts, including the normal form, the extensive
form, the option form, and the graph model. Each modelling strategy conveys a particular
amount of information based on its illustrative capacity. The normal form, for instance, is
compact, easy to draw, and simple to read. However, it can only be used for small conflicts
where the number of DMs is limited to two or three. There is also a limited amount of
information conveyed through the extensive form. GMCR, which can use the option form
for notation, is the most comprehensive modelling approach for conflicts. It presents moves
and countermoves only when they exist. GMCR can account for moves that are reversible
or irreversible and common, and preferences that are either transitive or intransitive.
4.3.1 The Graph Model for Conflict Resolution
As noted in Section 2.3, for each DM, the Graph Model for Conflict Resolution consists of
three main elements: feasible states, unilateral moves, and preferences. The graph model
for DMi is Gi = (S,Ai, {i,∼i}) where Gi is the DM’s i graph, S is the set of feasible
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states, Ai is the set of unilateral moves available for DMi such that Ai ⊆ S × S, and
{i,∼i} represents DMi’s preference relation; for any s, q ∈ S, s i q means state s is
more preferred than state q, and s ∼i q means state s is indifferent to state q for DMi.
Each graph consists of a collection of directed graphs Di∈N = (S,Ai∈N). These directed
graphs consist of nodes and arcs. Each node represents a state s ∈ S, and each arc Ai
represents a unilateral move available to DMi. The list of reachable states by DMi is
denoted by Ri and is defined by:
Ri(s, q) =
 1 if DMi can move unilaterally from state s to q0 otherwise
Based on the reachable list of a DM, each arc is drown in a solid line and the direction
indicating the move end point. An example of the graph model for Brinco is given in
Section 4.4.3
4.3.2 The Preference Graph Model
Changes are proposed to the original definition of graph model to introduce the preference
graph model. The elements of the Preference Graph Model remain similar to the original
graph. However, the oriented arcs no longer represent unilateral moves, but rather, uni-
lateral improvements. Hence, desired but not possible moves are represented by dashed
oriented arcs to differentiate between an available and a desired but not possible unilateral
move. Now, the graph model for DMi becomes Gi = (S,Mi, Vi, Ui) where Gi is the DM’s
i graph, S is the set of feasible states, Mi is the set of reversible unilateral improvements
available for DMi such that Mi ⊆ S × S, Vi is the set of irreversible unilateral improve-
ments available for DMi such that Vi ⊆ S×S and Ui is the set of desired but not available
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moves such that Ui ⊆ S × S, in symbols, Ui = {(s1, s2) ∈ S × S : (s1, s2) /∈ Mi ∪ Vi and
s2 i s1}.
There are a number of directed graphs different than the one in the original graph
model. In the original graph model arcs represented unilateral moves available to a DM
without regard to the DM’s preference of the states. Now, because the new preference
graph model focuses on representing the preferences using different shaped arcs, the new
reachable list is denoted by R∗i and defined as:
R∗i (s, q) =

Mi if Ri(s, q) = Ri(q, s) = 1 and q i s
Vi if Ri(s, q) = 1 6= Ri(q, s) and q i s
Ui if Ri(s, q) = Ri(q, s) = 0 and q i s
0 otherwise
The Preference Graph Model can provide insights into stability analysis of individual
DMs. A comparison between the original graph model and the preference graph model is
given in Section 4.4.3. For example, in Figure 4.6 it can be inferred that Brinco is Nash
stable at states 7 and 9, because there are no unilateral improvements from these states.
Such advantage will simplify the analysis of conflicts using the Preference Graph Model
for Conflict Resolution.
4.4 Case Study: the Great Canadian Hydroelectric
Power Conflict
In this section, the proposed characterization categories of a conflict are applied to the
Great Canadian Hydroelectric Power conflict (Feehan and Baker, 2007; Feehan, 2011; Mat-
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bouli et al., 2012b, 2014b), followed by an illustrative example of using the preference graph
model. In the characterization of this conflict, modes of the conflict and parameters are
discussed.
4.4.1 Modes of the Great Canadian Hydroelectric Power Conflict
1. Incipient conflict : In the period from 1958 to 1963, Brinco was established and the
letter of intent regarding the Churchill Falls project was signed (Feehan and Baker,
2007).
2. Active conflict : The conflict has seen activity over several periods. The first is
marked by the negotiations between Brinco and Que´bec (QC), which ended in the
contract signed in 1969. The second active period of the conflict started in 1971 when
Newfoundland and Labrador (NL) expressed dissatisfaction over the agreement until
its challenge was ended by the rulings of The Supreme Court of Canada (The Supreme
Court of Canada, 1988a,b). The third round of active conflict started in 2003 when
NL proposed to develop the Lower Churchill Falls project. If the third round ends, a
fourth round of active conflict is expected to take place when the automatic renewal
clause comes into force in 2016 (Feehan and Baker, 2007).
3. Dormant conflict : Between active conflict rounds there is a dormancy period. The
shortest was after the deal was signed. The longer the dormancy period, the less
intense the conflict, especially when the active rounds do not result in a change in
the equilibrium.
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4.4.2 Parameters of the Great Canadian Hydroelectric Power
Conflict
Québec'
Labrador'
Newfoundland'
New'
Brunswick'
Maine'
New'
Hampshire'
Vermont'
New'York'
Ontario'
Nova'ScoAa'
PEI'
AtlanAc'
Ocean'
Churchill'Falls'
Gull'Island'
Muskrat'Falls'
QC’s'Transmission'Line'
MariAme’s'Transmission'Line'
Gulf'of'St.'
Lawrence'
Figure 4.4: Churchill Falls Location and Transmission Routes
Decision Makers
• Number of DMs: this conflict has many DMs, summarized in Table 4.1 (Matbouli
et al., 2014b) and described as follows (Matbouli et al., 2014b):
1. The Government of Newfoundland and Labrador (NL): NL is the owner of the
Churchill Falls site (CF). NL wants to encourage investment to develop its own
economy. The CF is located far from the NL capital and populous areas.
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2. The Government of Que´bec (QC): The NL-QC border is adjacent to the Churchill
Falls site. QC has a transmission line nearby, and a large hydroelectric power
capacity that enables it to export energy to neighbouring provinces and to the
United States.
3. The British Newfoundland Development Corporation (Brinco): Brinco was es-
tablished by NL with the help of British industrialists and bankers to develop
industrial opportunities in NL.
4. Churchill Falls (Labrador) Corporation (CFLCo): CFLCO was established by
Brinco to exploit the hydropower potential of CF. Brinco invited Shawinigan
Engineering to take a 20% stake in CFLCo.
5. Hydro-Que´bec (HQ): Hydro-Que´bec is the hydroelectric utility in QC, in charge
of producing and transmitting power in the province. It owns the transmission
line that CFLCo could use.
6. Shawinigan Engineering: Shawinigan was a privately owned engineering consul-
tancy, which was later nationalized by QC, with vast experience in hydropower.
It has a 20% stake in CFLCo.
7. Financing Institutions: A group of banks and financial institutions were ap-
proached to finance the CF project.
8. The Canadian Federal Government.
9. The Supreme Court of Canada.
• Types of DMs: NL, Brinco, and CFLCo can be treated together because they rep-
resent a hierarchy of power and have the same interests. These DMs are directly
impacted by the result of the conflict, and can be considered to be key players.
Brinco led the other DMs in the negotiations. Similarly, QC and Hydro-Que´bec are
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Table 4.1: Decision Makers, Options, and Preferences of the Great Canadian Hydroelectric
Power Conflict (Matbouli et al., 2012b, 2014b)
DMs Options Outcomes
States 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Brinco
TVQC Y N N Y N N Y N N Y N N
TVM N N Y N N N N N Y N N N
STQC N Y N N Y N N Y N N Y N
Call off N N N N N Y N N N N N Y
Preference Ranking 7  8  9  11  10  12  6  1 ∼ 2 ∼ 3 ∼ 4 ∼ 5
QC
Sign Y Y N N N N Y Y N N N N
Delay N N Y Y Y Y N N Y Y Y Y
Preference Ranking 8  2  3 ∼ 4  6  5 ∼ 11  10 ∼ 12  1 ∼ 7  9
Investors Finance N N N N N N Y Y Y Y Y Y
Preference Ranking 7 ∼ 8  1 ∼ 2  3 ∼ 4 ∼ 5 ∼ 6 ∼ 10  9 ∼ 11  12
Note TVQC Transmit via Que´bec
TVM Transmit via Maritime Route
STQC Sell to Que´bec
also considered to be key DMs because the outcome of the conflict directly impacts
their interests. The financial institutions, on the other hand, are considered as a
support DM, because their role can facilitate the outcome of the conflict, but they
do not have a major interest in it. Finally, the Federal Government and the Supreme
Court of Canada are both considered third-party interveners who have the power to
change the outcome of the conflict.
• First move: Brinco and its partners (NL and CFLCo) made the first move in the
conflict. They were motivated enough to deviate from the status quo. Any outcome
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that is not more preferred than the status quo is not acceptable to them.
• Proactive and reactive: Brinco and its partners were proactive in most instances.
They initiated moves to which QC responded with a countermove and/or an agree-
ment.
• Preferences: The preferences of the DMs in the first round are ranked in Table 4.1
(Matbouli et al., 2012b, 2014b).
• Changes in DMs: there have been a number of important changes in DMs, summa-
rized as follows:
1. QC nationalized all Que´bec-based hydroelectric companies including Hydro-
Que´bec and Shawinigan Engineering during the negotiations.
2. NL purchased Brinco’s share in CFLCo shortly after the deal was signed with
QC. With this move, NL tries to gain control of the decision making role.
3. In 2012, the federal government announced that it will guarantee loans for NL
to finance the Lower Churchill Falls project.
Objectives
The objective of the DM who made the first move from the status quo, namely, Brinco and
its partners, is to maximize the exploitation of the Churchill Falls hydropower potential.
For Hydro-Que´bec, the objective is to minimize competition to its market and increase
its own share of the hydroelectric power market. The objectives of both DMs seem to
be incompatible. An increase in market share for Brinco will result in a decrease for
Hydro-Que´bec.
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Options
When Brinco and its partners considered developing the Churchill Falls hydropower po-
tentials, they assumed three options: transfer produced power via QC, transfer it via the
Maritimes (see Figure 4.4), or cancel the entire project. When QC was approached, it had
two options: accept immediately or delay signing the contract. Options are summarized
in Table 4.1 (Matbouli et al., 2012b). Please note that (Y): Yes, and (N): No.
Status Quo
The Great Canadian Hydroelectric Power Conflict has taken place in four rounds. The
status quo of each round is described as follows:
1. In 1963, at the first status quo, Brinco approached Hydro-Que´bec and started nego-
tiations in regard to the exploitation of Churchill Falls hydropower potential.
2. The second status quo is the equilibrium after the negotiations resulted in signing a
definitive contract in 1969. The second round of the conflict took place to challenge
this status quo.
3. The third status quo, in 1988, was the equilibrium of the second round, which took
place as the Supreme Court of Canada ruled on the second round.
4. The fourth status quo for a future round of the conflict is not yet defined, pending
the outcome of the current negotiations of the Lower Churchill Falls project.
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4.4.3 Example of the Graph Model versus the Preference Graph
Model for Brinco
Original Graph Model for Brinco
For example, consider the graph model for Brinco given in Figure 4.5. There are twelve
states S = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12} and the preference relation for Brinco is:
7  8  9  11  10  12  6  1 ∼ 2 ∼ 3 ∼ 4 ∼ 5 (4.1)
1 
2 
3 4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 10 
11 
12 
Preference Ranking for Brinco is 7 ≻ 8 ≻ 9 ≻ 11 ≻ 10 ≻ 12 ≻ 6 ≻1 ∼ 2 ∼ 3 ∼ 4 ∼ 5                        Preference Ranking    
Figure 4.5: The Graph Model for Brinco
In Figure 4.5, all elements of the graph are represented: states by numbered nodes
referring to each feasible states’, oriented arcs, which represent possible unilateral moves
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for Brinco, and finally preferences, which are written at the bottom of the graph. Although
the preferences are written with the graph, they seem more like an attachment to the graph
rather than an original element of the graph. This leads to the proposed improvement in
the graph model, which is presented in the next section.
The Preference Graph Model for Brinco
Utilizing the same illustrative example given in Section 4.4, the enhanced graph model
as shown in Figure 4.6 represents the proposed developments in the graph model. Solid
arcs represent preferred unilateral moves for Brinco (Mi). All solid arcs in this graph
are reversible, except the moves to node 6 where a vertical line crosses the solid arc, 7→
or 9, which represent an irreversible move (Vi). The dashed arcs represent preferences
but not actual moves. Thus, Brinco would prefer to move from state 9 to 8 but cannot
do so unilaterally (Ui). The combined nodes of (1, 2) and (3, 4, 5) represent groups of
equally preferred states, where Brinco can unilaterally move within each group. The main
advantage of the enhanced graph is that preferences are embedded in the graph, helping
the analyst to find states that are stable for the DM. Moreover, knowing which moves are
desired but not available to the DM can be used to understand the evolution of a conflict.
4.5 Conclusions
This work provides the basis for the analysis of long-term conflicts. In long-term conflicts,
there is a need to define the parameters of the original conflict in order to understand
whether or not disputes over the same issue can be analyzed and attributed to the original
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1,2 
3,4,5 
8 7 11 12 10 9 6 
Figure 4.6: The Preference Graph Model for Brinco
or not. Conflict analysis requires that a conflict is studied from the beginning. Modes
of the conflict provide a framework to define stages of a conflict from goal realization, to
initiation and resolution. Also, an analyst should pay more attention to the macro level
of a conflict for the purpose of resolution. The parameters of the conflict can define which
features are unique to the attribution and which are not.
Moreover, embedding the preferences of a DM in the graph not only facilitated the
understanding of unilateral improvements and desired moves, but also simplified the anal-
ysis and recognition of certain individual stability conditions. However, even though the
preference graph in its current form does not account for intransitive preferences, most
real life conflicts have transitive preferences. The original graph model can account for
intransitive preferences by providing a list of pairwise comparison of all states attached to
the graph.
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4.6 Chapter Summary
The fact that a conflict takes place in many rounds can obscure its nature. This research
aims to answer the question of how to determine whether several rounds of a conflict
happening at different points in time are connected. A conflict starts when a decision maker
challenges a status quo. A decision maker can be involved in more than one conflict at a
time; the features that differentiate conflicts are the objectives of the decision makers. The
objectives are reflected in the decision makers’ preferences over outcomes. The ultimate
goal for a decision maker in a conflict is to obtain the most preferred achievable state.
In addition, GMCR is enhanced to provide the analyst with more in-depth information
about an underlying conflict. This improvement is achieved by representing decision mak-
ers’ preferences within the graph, which makes it possible to infer Nash stability condition
by glancing at the graph.
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Chapter 5
Robustness of Equilibria in the
Graph Model for Conflict Resolution
Strategic conflicts can be formally modelled and analyzed using the Graph Model for
Conflict Resolution (GMCR) (Kilgour et al., 1987; Fang et al., 1993; Hipel, 2009a,b; Kilgour
and Eden, 2010; Hipel et al., 2011), which utilizes various stability concepts to determine
possible equilibria or resolutions to a given conflict, and thereby obtain strategic insights.
It has been observed that some real world conflicts demonstrate that it is possible for
conflicts to continue evolving even after reaching an equilibrium (Matbouli et al., 2013a,
2014b). Therefore, further analysis of equilibrium robustness is desired in order to gain
some insights about the sustainability of a resolution. In this research, robust equilibrium
is not necessarily a binary relation; instead, robustness can be viewed as a level in which
equilibria are ranked from most robust to least robust. Such a methodology, for example,
will make it possible to distinguish between stable states, where, for instance, in the sense
of GMCR, a specific Nash equilibrium can be more stable than another Nash equilibrium.
A new formal robustness of equilibrium analysis is introduced within GMCR, which
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will provide insights for better understanding the evolution of long-term conflicts. Refined
stability definitions are presented, which facilitates the evaluation of equilibrium robust-
ness, thereby making conflict resolution more sustainable. In the following sections, a
background on strategic long-term conflicts is summarized. Then, a formal methodology
for analyzing robust stability and ranking procedures to assess equilibrium robustness are
proposed. The new strategic approach is applied to a groundwater contamination dispute
that took place in Elmira, Ontario, Canada. Subsequently, strategic results and insights
obtained when applying robustness of equilibria analysis, are discussed. The contents of
this chapter are based on the publications by Matbouli et al. (2013c, 2014a, 2015c)
5.1 Background
5.1.1 Strategic Conflicts
Strategic conflicts are a complex form of decision making (Jeong et al., 2008) where each
decision maker (DM) considers his or her options while thinking about other DMs’ moves.
In such a situation, a DM cannot achieve a desired outcome without carefully anticipat-
ing the decisions of opponents. Conflict conditions exist when two or more DMs pursue
incompatible goals (Galtung, 2008). Modelling and analysis of these interactive decision-
making problems have been widely implemented using game-theoretic methodologies, such
as GMCR. The development of the graph model started in 1987 by Kilgour et al. (1987),
while the first book on the topic was written in 1993 by Fang et al. (1993). It has been
widely used around the world in various application areas such as environmental conflicts
(Kilgour et al., 2001), energy disputes (Matbouli et al., 2014b), negotiations (Sheikhmo-
hammady et al., 2010), policy design (Zeng et al., 2004), and business applications (Kilgour
and Hipel, 2005).
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5.1.2 Long-term Conflicts
The need to study the robustness of equilibria is recognized because some real world con-
flicts, such as the great Canadian hydroelectric power conflict (Matbouli et al., 2014b),
continued to evolve even after reaching a predicted resolution, thereby creating a challenge
to modelling and analysis. For the purpose of analyzing such conflicts, a new concept of
robustness of equilibria is introduced to make the classification of resolutions possible, and
permit the examination of the sustainability of different solution concepts. As Figure 5.1
shows, after an active conflict reaches an equilibrium, it may or may not transform into a
long-term conflict if preferences change. A measure of equilibrium robustness is introduced
in the methodology section.
Active Conflict
Robust Resolution
Robust 
Equilibrium?
No
Yes
Yes
Preference Change?
Figure 5.1: Long-term Conflict
5.1.3 The Graph Model for Conflict Resolution (GMCR)
The definitions of GMCR and stability concepts of Nash, SEQ, GMR, and SMR are given
in Section 2.3 starting from page 10 of this dissertation.
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5.1.4 Robustness of Equilibria
Although robustness of equilibria is a fresh concept in GMCR, the term robustness of
equilibria is not entirely new, as it has been used in game theory settings by Fudenberg
et al. (1988), and it has also been suggested that some equilibrium states are more stable
than others (Kohlberg and Mertens, 1986). Methodologies have been put forward to fur-
ther refine the definition of equilibrium in order to find the most stable, robust, or likely
equilibrium, by assigning probabilistic weights to opponents’ strategies to exclude unlikely
equilibria.
Examples of robustness of equilibria approaches in game theory include perfect equilib-
rium (Selten, 1975), proper equilibrium (Myerson, 1978), strategically stable equilibrium
(Kohlberg and Mertens, 1986), and robust equilibria of potential games (Ui, 2001).
Moreover, robustness can be attributed by the flexibility of DMs (Rosenhead et al.,
1972; Rosenhead and Wiedemann, 1979; Rosenhead and Mingers, 2001). In this respect,
a DM makes robust decisions by maintaining flexibility against unforeseeable changes in
future.
However, in long-term conflicts in general, and in GMCR in particular, the interest
is not to predict the most likely equilibria. Instead, the goal is to find which equilib-
ria are more resilient to change, and sustainable in relative comparison, in other words,
which equilibria are more likely to persist despite future uncertainties or gradual preference
changes.
Therefore, a fresh concept in conflict resolution, Level of Freedom (LoF) (Matbouli
et al., 2014a), was introduced as a new measure in equilibrium robustness. A formal
framework for equilibrium analysis is presented in the next section.
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5.2 Methodology
Strategic long-term conflicts take place when two or more interested parties seek incom-
patible objectives (Galtung, 2008). Although equilibria can be seen as resolutions for such
conflicts, the tendency of conflicts to evolve can be attributed to many reasons, one of
which is the changing of preference. Future changes in preferences can be hard to predict.
When a preference change takes place, the stability concepts of individual stabilities of
DMs at some states no longer hold. Preferences can change for a number of reasons, for
example, a change in goal realization because of external or internal factors. Take, for in-
stance, a conflict arising over the utilization of limited water resources. When the demand
of one region increases, more water needs to be drawn, which could put a prior agreement
at risk of initiating a conflict.
There are three main input parameters for GMCR: DMs, options, and preferences.
The reliability of equilibria states, which are the output of GMCR, depends on the quality
of the inputs. Because uncertainty is prevalent in real world conflicts, DMs, options,
and preferences can be assumed to be characterized by high variability. To account for
uncertainty of conflict parameters, there are a number of extensions to the original graph
model which account for uncertainty at the present or historical state of a conflict, such as
fuzzy preferences (Al-Mutairi et al., 2008; Bashar et al., 2012), and stochastic preferences
(Reˆgo and Santos, 2013). If uncertainty exists in the present conditions of a conflict,
future changes are even more uncertain (Pye, 1978). The robustness of equilibrium method
provides insights into the sensitivity of stable states against future changes by considering
available moves DMs.
In the proposed enhancement, the information about DMs, options, and preferences
is assumed to be complete. However, considering the risk of future changes, some Nash
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stable states can be more robust than other Nash stable states based on the possibility of
deviation from the state on account of future changes.
5.2.1 Factors in Equilibrium Robustness
Robustness of an equilibrium is a relative measure that is dependent on the characteristics
of a particular conflict being studied. The comparison and evaluation of equilibrium ro-
bustness is based on three factors: Level of Freedom (LoF) (Matbouli et al., 2014a), type
of individual stability, and relative preference. The thought process that led to the idea of
LoF started by looking for possible unilateral escapes from stable states.
Level of Freedom (LoF)
In ongoing long-term conflicts, some equilibrium conditions may remain satisfied even when
the preferences of one or more DMs change in a new round. This situation can be linked
to the availability of moves; for example, when a DM has no possibility of moving from an
equilibrium, the conditions for stability will be maintained.
The level of freedom (LoF) constitutes a rough measure to assess relative resistance
to a stability disruption in cases of preference change (Matbouli et al., 2014a). If a DM
changes his or her preferences for any reason, a stability condition may not be maintained.
Therefore, the concept of LoF evaluates the robustness of stability of a given state for a
particular DM, by counting the number of unilateral moves available to the DM. If the
focal DM has a high LoF, it means that even a small change in preference would likely
disturb the equilibrium. If the LoF is very low, or if it is zero, even a dramatic change in
preference will not affect the equilibrium.
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Assume that DM i finds states s1 and s2 to be Nash stable. Assume also that from
state s1, there is no unilateral move available to DM i, while at state s2 there are three
available moves that are disimprovements for DM i. Now, both states are Nash, but which
state is more stable? For the case of preference change for DM i, his or her stability at
state s1 cannot be affected. For state s2, however, if the preference change for DM i makes
an available move a unilateral improvement, then the conditions of Nash stability at state
s2 will no longer be valid. Thus, even though both states s1 and s2 are Nash stable, state
s1 is more robust than state s2.
LoF can be calculated in a number of ways. For example, one may count the available
number of moves from the present state in one step to other states. Or an analyst may
choose to extend the horizon to calculate the number of moves in two or three consecutive
steps ahead. However, LoF should be interpreted only relatively. The difference between
LoFs of 4 and 5 may not be significant, but larger differences in LoF tend to indicate a
significant difference in the robustness of the states. A state is Absolutely Robust for an
individual stability concept, as introduced in Section 5.2.2, when LoF is zero, the absolute
minimum for a stability definition.
In this chapter, a two-step calculation has been chosen for LoF, by counting the number
of unilateral moves from the present state, regardless of the type of move: unilateral
improvement, disimprovement, or neither. States that are one move ahead from the present
state can be endpoints or transitional nodes. There is the possibility to encounter two-step
loops that return to the initial state. Since the aim is to find the robustness of a state
relative to another state, the count of the number of moves was limited to two sets of
moves. The first set of moves is counted from the present state to the next endpoint. The
second set of moves is counted based on the number of moves leading to transitional nodes
multiplied by two. LoF is defined as follows (Matbouli et al., 2014a):
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Definition 8. LoFi(s) = 2c− d, where c is the number of UMs from state s, and d is the
number of UMs from state s that lead to a stable state for the DM .
In addition, state s1 in the above example, which is a Nash stable state with no pos-
sible unilateral moves, is called an Absolutely Robust state. Further definitions related to
absolute robustness are presented in Section 5.2.2.
Moreover, calculating LoF for each DM at every state, can produce some interesting
properties, some of which are given below:
1. If a state s has an LoFi(s) = 1, then s is Nash stable for DM i iff s i Ri(s).
2. If for a state s the number of feasible states is not greater than LoFi(s) + 1, then
DM i can move unilaterally from state s to any state in the conflict.
3. If LoFi(s) = 0 and Ri(q) = s, then the move from q to s is irreversible.
4. If, for all states s ∈ S, LoFi(s) = 0, then DM i has no choices in the conflict.
5. If LoFi(s) = 0, then s is Nash, SEQ, GMR, and SMR stable for DM i.
Types of Individual Stability
There are four types of stability considered for robustness of equilibria analysis: Nash,
SEQ, GMR and SMR. It is generally accepted that Nash and SEQ stability concepts
are stronger than GMR and SMR, because of the sociological assumption that supports
each stability definition. In Nash, the DM is assumed to move unilaterally when a better
outcome is achieved. In SEQ, the DM avoids making a UI, fearing a credible threat which
will put his or her opponent in a better position while harming the focal DM. On the other
hand, in GMR and SMR stable states, the focal DM is assumed to abstain from making
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a unilateral improvement to avoid a less credible sanctioning. In GMR and SMR, the
threat of sanctioning assumes that an opponent DM may harm his or her own position in
order to put the focal DM in a worse state. This assumption is less likely than the general
assumption that in strategic conflicts, DMs seek to improve their outcome and not the
reverse.
In order to rank individual stabilities, LoF is measured in two separate categories:
strong stability concepts: (Nash and SEQ), and weak stability concepts (GMR and SMR).
Initially, all Nash and SEQ states are assumed to be more robust than GMR and SMR
states. In addition, within each category, the lower the LoF, the higher the robustness
ranking of individual stability with respect to the focal DM.
Preferences
Since LoF assesses the possibility of deviation in case of preference change, it is useful to
consider preferences when ranking equilibrium robustness. Assume that a DM i has the
same LoF at two stable states of the same type. To determine which state is more robust
in this case, it is plausible to compare the preferences of both states. The state that is
more preferred to the focal DM is considered more robust for the respective DM.
5.2.2 Robust Individual Stabilities
A robust state is a particular case of stability robustness where LoF is equal to the absolute
minimum for each stability type. An absolutely robust equilibrium is the state that all
DMs find to be robust stable. The robust stable states —Nash, SEQ, GMR, and SMR—
are defined below.
Definition 9. s ∈ SRNashi ⇐⇒ Ri(s) = ∅
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Note that state s is a Robust Nash (RNash Stable) iff DM i has no UM from s. Thus
SRNashi ⊆ SNashi , i.e. s robust Nash is Nash. Clearly s is Robust Nash iff LoFi(s) = 0.
Definition 10. s ∈ SRSEQi ⇐⇒ ∀q ∈ R+i (s),∃x ∈ R+N−i(q) 3 x -i s ∧ x ∈ SStablei
In SEQ stability, a DM abstains from making a UI to avoid a credible sanctioning by
the opponent. For Robust SEQ (RSEQ), there is at most one possible move that is the UI,
and this UI leads to an end point (stable state), not a transitional state. State s is Robust
SEQ iff LoFi(s) ≤ 1.
Definition 11. s ∈ SRGMRi ⇐⇒ ∀q ∈ R+i (s), x ∈ RN−i(q) 3 x -i s ∧ x ∈ SStablei .
Likewise, in Robust GMR (RGMR), the number of moves LoFi(s) ≤ 1 is similar to
the LoF of RSEQ, except that the threat of sanctioning in RGMR is less credible than in
RSEQ.
Definition 12. s ∈ SSMRi ⇐⇒ ∀q ∈ R+i (s),∃x ∈ RN−i(q) 3 x -i s∧ ∀h ∈ R+i (x) 3 h -i
s ∧ x ∈ SStablei
The focal DM, who finds a state to be SMR stable, considers two moves ahead from
the present state, so there is at most 2 unilateral moves. Thus, a Robust SMR state has a
LoFi(s) ≤ 2.
In the definitions above, it can be observed that UDs are taken into consideration when
performing robust stability analysis (see Table 5.1). The number of moves considered
ahead is no different from regular stability definitions as seen in Table 2.1. However, there
are more types of future moves considered.
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Table 5.1: Foresight of Focal Decision Maker in Different Robust Stability Conditions
Stability Definitions Foresight Focal DM Opponent DM
Robust Nash (RNash) One move UI, UD -
Robust Sequential Stability (RSEQ) Two moves UI, UD UI
Robust General Metarationality (RGMR) Two moves UI, UD UI, UD
Robust Symmetric Metarationality (RSMR) Three moves UI, UD UI, UD
5.2.3 Ranking of Robustness of Equilibria
In order to relatively rank equilibria robustness, two steps of the ranking are performed.
First, each individual stability that results in equilibrium is ranked from an individual
DM’s perspective. Then, the overall ranking is ordered based on individual ranking of
stable states.
Ranking of Individual Stability
The interest here is only to rank states that represent equilibria. So this is kind of a reverse
process. After individual stability analysis is performed, and equilibria points are defined,
we go back to individual stability states and select only those pertaining to equilibria.
For each DM, rank the individual states based on LoF in two groups: one is the group
of Nash and SEQ stable states, and the other group consists of GMR and SMR stable
states. For each group, the states are ranked from most robust to least robust, with the
state having the lowest LoF regarded as the most robust. Then combine the ranking of
both groups by assigning all Nash and SEQ stable states a higher order of robustness than
GMR and SMR states. Ties in ranking are acceptable at this stage. Assign an order
number for each individual state from each DM’s perspective as seen in the first section of
Table 5.2.
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Overall Ranking of Equilibria Robustness
For each state, combine the order number given from each DM’s perspective (see Table
5.2). The states are ranked based on the summation of ranks for each state from most
robust to least robust. The lower the order of ranking, the higher the robustness. For
ease of interpretation, re-adjust the order number with the lowest order starting at 1. At
this stage, in case of a tie in ranking, we investigate the preferences according to either
methodology discussed in Section 5.2.1. However, if the equilibrium states have exactly
the same LoF and type of stability, then ranking equilibrium robustness based on LoF is
not currently possible. This is because the possibility of deviation from equilibria will be
identical among equilibrium states.
Table 5.2: Ranking of Equilibrium Robustness
DMs
Equilibrium States
s1 s2 . . . sn
DM1 Rank1(s1) Rank1(s2) Rank1(. . . ) Rank1(sn)
DM2 Rank2(s1) Rank2(s2) Rank2(. . . ) Rank2(sn)
...
...
...
...
...
DMN RankN(s1) RankN(s2) RankN(. . . ) RankN(sn)
Overall Ranking
N∑
i=1
(RankN(s1))
N∑
i=1
(RankN(s2))
N∑
i=1
(RankN(s...))
N∑
i=1
(RankN(sn))
5.2.4 Insights from Level of Freedom
The utilization of LoF can provide interesting insights that not only rank equilibria ac-
cording to robustness, but also highlight general assessments about the robustness of stable
states for DMs in a conflict.
Theorem 5.2.1. Suppose that, for DM i,
∑
s∈S LoFi(s) ≤ n, where n is the total number
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of feasible states. Then, there is at least one state that is Nash, and RNash for DM i.
Proof. If the total LoFi is less than the number of feasible states, then one or more states
must have LoFi = 0.
Theorem 5.2.2. For a 2-DM conflict {i, j}, suppose DM j has LoFj(q) = 0. Then, DM j
cannot sanction any move by DM i to state q
Proof. If LoFj(q) = 0, then DM j has no unilateral move from state q. Therefore, DM j
cannot sanction any move by his or her opponent.
Theorem 5.2.3. If state s is RNash for DM i, the state s is also RSEQ for DM i.
Proof. If state s is RNash for DM i, then Definition 10 for RSEQ is satisfied, because
Ri(s) = ∅
Theorem 5.2.4. If state s is RSEQ for DM i, the state s is also RGMR for DM i
Proof. If state s is RSEQ for DM i, then Definition 11 for RGMR is satisfied, since R+i (s) ⊆
Ri(s)
Theorem 5.2.5. If state s is RNash for DM i, the state s is also RSMR for DM i.
Proof. If state s is RNash for DM i, then Definition 12 for RSMR is satisfied, because
Ri(s) = ∅
The above interrelationships among robust individual stabilities are similar to the stan-
dard stability concepts (Fang et al., 1993). Moreover, it is also noteworthy that each robust
stability definition is a subset of the original corresponding stability definitions, as depicted
in Figure 5.2. For example, if state s is RNash, then state s is also Nash stable, because
SRNash ⊆ SNash.
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Figure 5.2: Interrelationships between Robust and Standard Stability Concepts
5.3 Case Study: Elmira Groundwater Contamination
Conflict
In 1989, the contamination was discovered in the drinking water source of Elmira, which
is a Canadian town located in southwestern Ontario, about 100 km west of Toronto. The
contamination was attributed to chemical discharges released by Uniroyal Chemical Ltd.
(UR), which ran a chemical plant. The Ontario Ministry of Environment (MoE) issued a
control order demanding UR to remediate the water pollution. UR appealed the control
order issued by MoE, while the local government (LG) insisted that the MoE enforce its
initial control order without modification of the original control order (Hipel et al., 1993;
Mehta and Oullet, 1995). Eventually, MoE modified its control order, and UR accepted
it.
77
5.3.1 Background
The events that followed the discovery of the water contamination at Elmira are modelled
using the graph model for conflict resolution. This water conflict has been modelled pre-
viously by Hipel et al. (1993) using GMCR. The same conflict is modified by removing
LG from the model. This seems plausible because the LG did not have much say in the
conflict other than insisting to MoE to keep its original control order. In addition, the
deal between MoE and UR came as a surprise to LG. However, robustness of equilibria of
the original model has also been analyzed in (Matbouli et al., 2015c).
5.3.2 Modelling of Elmira Groundwater Contamination Conflict
This conflict is modelled at the point where UR appealed the control order. The MoE
has two options: modify the control order to appease UR or not. UR, on the other hand,
could delay responding to the control order, accept it, or abandon the plant. A summary
of the DMs and their options are given in Table 5.3. The feasible states are also shown in
Table 5.3. The letter “Y” in the table indicates “Yes” and “N” indicates “No” for each
corresponding option. Figure 5.3 represents the integrated graph model of the conflict,
where available moves for each DM are shown.
5.3.3 Stability Analysis
Stability analysis is performed in Table 5.4 (r) indicates a rational state (Nash), and (u)
indicates an unstable state. For MoE, all states are Nash stable, because MoE has no UIs
from any state. UR finds all states to be stable except states 3 and 2. UDs are shown
but not used in regular stability analysis; however, they will be used in calculating LoF.
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Table 5.3: Elmira Conflict: Decision Makers, Options, and States
DMs & Options
States
1 2 3 4 5
MoE
1. Modify N Y N Y -
UR
2. Delay Y Y N N N
3. Accept N N Y Y N
4. Abandon N N N N Y
Overall, the analysis of the model results in three equilibria: states 1, 4, and 5. Analysis
of equilibria robustness is presented in the following section.
5.3.4 Analysis of Equilibria of Elmira Water Conflict
For the three equilibrium states {s1, s4, s5}, LoF is calculated for MoE and UR at each
state as shown in Table 5.5. On the right column of Table 5.5, states are ranked based on
robustness for each DM respectively. Then, in Table 5.6 the overall equilibria robustness is
represented. It shows that state s5 is the most robust state. Also, it meets the requirement
for the special case of absolutely robust equilibrium. This means that if the conflict reaches
to state s5, it is not possible to destabilize the conflict, even in the case of preference
changes, because there are no moves available for any DM. State s5 represents the situation
where UR abandons the plant. According to the model this is an irreversible move for UR,
and MoE has no moves from s5.
The least robust state is s1, which represents the situation where MoE refuses to modify
its control order, and UR delays. This state clearly cannot be a permanent resolution.
Finally, state s4 represents the situation that took place, where MoE modifies the
79
1 
2 
5 
3 
4 
M
oE
 M
oE 
UR 
UR 
MoE Preferences = {3, 4, 1, 2, 5} 
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Figure 5.3: Graph Model for the Elmira Water Conflict
control order, and UR accepts it, which is less robust than state s5, because if UR changes
its preference, it can abandon the project. This scenario is possible, for example, if market
conditions become unfavourable for UR causing it to lose profits. In such a case, UR may
change its preference and prefer state s5 over s4, which will disturb the stability conditions
at state s4.
In addition, see Figure 5.4, which shows available moves from each equilibrium state.
Looking at the graph, it can be inferred that the results of LoF are consistent with possible
escapes as shown in the graph. For state 1, there seems to be many possible escapes
compared to states 4 and 5. It can be deduced from the graph that state 5 is the most
robust equilibrium because there is no way any DM can move away from this equilibrium.
State 1, on the other hand, has the highest possibility of escape among equilibria states.
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Table 5.4: Elmira Conflict: Decision Makers, Moves, and States
DMs & Moves States
Equilibrium States X E E X E
MoE
Preferences 3 4 1 2 5
Stability r r r r r
UIs
UDs 4 2
UR
Preferences 1 4 5 3 2
Stability r r r u u
UIs 5 4
5
UDs 3 5
5
Table 5.5: Levels of Freedom and Individual Stability Ranking
DMs
Levels of Freedom
Robustness Ranking of Individual Stability
s1 s4 s5
MoE 1 0 0 {s4, s5} > {s1}
UR 3 1 0 {s5} > {s4} > {s1}
5.4 Conclusions
In this chapter, a formal analysis of robustness of equilibria is presented to provide insights
on the resiliency of equilibria to change in preference. The result can be insightful as
seen in the case study of the Elmira groundwater contamination conflict. This approach
provides an interesting view on the possibility of deviation from equilibrium. The essence
of the new approach is the concept of LoF. GMCR defines stability based on moves and
preferences, and a DM is confined to available moves, but his or her preferences can change.
Perception of goals over time can cause preferences to change. Also, external factors such as
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Table 5.6: Overall Ranking of Equilibria Robustness for the Elmira Conflict
DMs
Ranking of Equilibrium
s1 s4 s5
MoE 2 1 1
UR 3 2 1
Overall Ranking 5 3 2
Adjusted Ranking 3 2 1
States Ranking {s5} > {s4} > {s1}
5 5 4 
UR 
1 2 
5 
3 
MoE UR 
U
R
 
Figure 5.4: Possible moves from Equilibria States
increased demand or natural phenomena may provide opportunities to disturb equilibria.
Ranking of equilibrium robustness is helpful to the analyst who is interested in ascertaining
which equilibria are more sustainable than others. This could be especially useful for third
party interveners attempting to resolve a long-term conflict. This research is the first to
introduce a systematic approach to robustness analysis within the graph model for conflict
resolution.
5.5 Chapter Summary
A novel approach for assessing the robustness of an equilibria in conflict resolution is
presented. Roughly, an equilibrium is robust if it is resilient, or resistant to deviation.
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Robustness assessment is based on a new concept called Level of Freedom, which evaluates
the relative freedom of a decision maker to escape an equilibrium. Resolutions of a con-
flict can be affected by changes in decision makers’ preferences, which may destabilize an
equilibrium, causing the conflict to evolve. Hence, a conflict may become long-term and
thereby continue to evolve, even after reaching an equilibrium. The new robustness mea-
sure is used to rank equilibria based on robustness, to facilitate distinguishing equilibria
that are relatively sustainable. An absolutely robust equilibrium is a special case in which
the Level of Freedom is at an absolute minimum for each individual stability definition.
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Chapter 6
Multi-Level Options for the Graph
Model for Conflict Resolution
This chapter is largely based on two publications (Matbouli et al., 2015a,b). An expansion
of the options structure is proposed to make the option-based graph model for conflict
resolution more explicitly expressive of reality. The suggested improvement provides an
opportunity to replace binary (on or off) options with multi-level options, wherein the
decision maker (DM) selects one out of more than two distinct levels. The new approach
simplifies the representation of conflicts and facilitates the understanding of their evolution
by including outcomes that involve partial achievement of a DM’s objectives. With multi-
level options, the preferences of decision makers can be related to the possibility of tradeoffs
between (or among) options.
The option form of the graph model for conflict resolution (Kilgour et al., 1987; Fang
et al., 1993; Hipel, 2009a,b; Kilgour and Eden, 2010; Hipel et al., 2011) is practical and
convenient, making graph models easy to construct in relatively few steps. But the current
restriction to binary options can be a hindrance, as on-or-off options do not seem to
84
express the real choices of decision makers (DMs) (Matbouli et al., 2015b). In this chapter,
multi-level options are introduced to provide a representation that captures some essential
features of the decision-making process. What is usually thought of as a single option may
be undertaken at a range of levels. For example, when a DM offers to sell a property, he
or she may adjust the sale price strategically, depending on preference for waiting time.
Selecting a relatively high asking price—and waiting for a willing buyer—may be preferable,
or not, to selecting an average market price and expecting an average wait until sale, or
offering to sell at a price lower than the estimated market value in order to gain a quick
sale.
The option form (Howard, 1971) of the graph model for conflict resolution (Kilgour
et al., 1987; Fang et al., 1993; Hipel, 2009a,b; Kilgour and Eden, 2010; Hipel et al., 2011)
uses binary options, i.e. with two levels only. If there is an option that is “inherently”
multi-level, the analyst must treat each of the levels as an independent binary option.
This modelling technique has several disadvantages. First, the binary options representing
a multi-level option are not independent, and must be linked by an at-most-one restriction
on feasibility – that is, any option combination including two or more of these options
must be declared infeasible. Second, there is redundancy in options, making a DM’s list
of options that much longer. It can be difficult to keep track of binary options that are
components of multi-level options, versus those that are independent. Third, difficulties
can arise in expressing the preferences of a DM with a multi-level option given as a set of
binary options, which must be linked. For example, it is easier to think of bargaining about
the level of an option rather than about which binary option is to be selected. In a graph
model of a negotiation, a DM’s choice to change options in response to the opponent’s
selections is crucial, and is also an important factor in understanding the evolution of
long-term conflicts.
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The next section provides background on the graph model for conflict resolution, es-
pecially the original option form. Then, the proposed expansion to multi-level options is
presented, followed by a case study of the Great Canadian Hydroelectric Power conflict,
where both two- and multi-level options can be utilized and compared.
6.1 Background
The Graph Model for Conflict Resolution (GMCR) uses directed graphs to represent the
dynamics of a strategic conflict in an informative manner. Relative to other forms of a
conflict model, a graph model is characterized by its flexibility; it can represent all types
of moves, and handle a rich range of preference structures, including intransitive ones. In
fact, the graph model is the only modelling technique that can represent the reversibility
of moves, an important feature that normal form games cannot represent. As also given
in Section 2.3, the graph model is defined as follows:
Definition 13. The graph model for conflict resolution (Fang et al., 1993) is defined as
G = 〈N,S, {Ai : i ∈ N}, {i,∼i; i ∈ N}〉 where N = {1, 2, 3, ..., n} is the set of DMs;
S = {1, 2, 3, ..., s} is the set of feasible states; Ai ⊆ S × S is the set of unilateral moves
available to DMi; and {i,∼i} is a strongly complete preference relation for DMi, such
that, for any s, q ∈ S, s i q means state s is more preferred than state q, and s ∼i q
indicates that state s is indifferent to state q for DMi.
Definition 14. For each DMi : i ∈ N , the directed graph of DMi, Gi = 〈S,Ai〉 contains
the states of the model, S, as vertices (nodes), and the possible moves as arcs (edges) Ai .
A DMi possesses an arc, (s, q) from state s ∈ S to state q ∈ S if and only if DMi has a
unilateral move from s to q. Beginning at any state s ∈ S, DMi’s reachable list is the set
of all q ∈ S such that (s, q) ∈ Ai.
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Definition 15. The (binary) option form of the graph model is based on a finite set of
options O and an ownership function g : O −→ N indicating that option k ∈ O is owned
(exercised, or not) by DMg(k). Options are combined to form the set of possible states; a
possible state is a subset K ⊆ O of options. Thus, the set of possible states is the power set
2O, consisting of all possible subsets of options. Of course, feasibility must be determined
separately as, for example, some pairs of options cannot be selected simultaneously.
For each i ∈ N , let Oi denote the set of options controlled by DMi. Then Oi = {k ∈
O : g(k) = i}. A strategy is a choice of options from Oi. A state in S results as soon
as each DM chooses a strategy, which is associated with 1 or 0 for each option the DM
controls. A mapping function f : O −→ {0, 1} represents strategy selection for a DM such
as:
f(o) =
 1 if DMg(o) selects option o0 otherwise
Thus, a possible state is an |O|-vector of strategy selection among DMs, hence, there
are 2|O| possible states. Feasibility considerations, for example, options that are mutually
exclusive, reduce the set of possible states 2O to S ⊆ 2O.
However, the graph model stability analysis considers only which states are stable if
reached, and does not provide a description of how they might be reached, for example by
specifying strategies.
6.2 Modelling Using Multi-Level Options
In this section, the proposed new definition of options in the graph model for conflict
resolution is introduced. However, before introducing multi-level options, a discussion of
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the evolution of long-term conflicts that inspired the expansion of options definition is
appropriate.
6.2.1 Evolution of Conflicts
The Great Canadian Hydroelectric Power conflict (Feehan and Baker, 2007; Feehan, 2011;
Matbouli et al., 2012b, 2014b) provides an interesting opportunity to understand the con-
flict evolution over time, and shows that an equilibrium may not necessarily be a permanent
resolution. This conflict took place in two historical rounds and one current round, and is
expected to continue in the future.
Evolution of conflicts can be thought of in two directions: inside-out or outside-in.
In Figure 6.1, the circles represent a conflict that evolves inside-out. In the conventional
approach, an equilibrium in the first round is considered to be an endpoint, and any
development afterward must be treated as a separate conflict. The problem with this
thinking is that the connection between rounds of the conflict is lost, and there is no
consideration of whether a resolution is unsustainable. Furthermore, when a conflict evolves
into something new and different, its analysis becomes very uncertain. On the other hand,
Figure 6.2 shows circles inside each other. The largest represents the first round of the
original conflict; the smaller it gets, the closer one DM comes to satisfying his or her
objectives. The advantage of this approach to conflict evolution is that the boundaries of
a conflict are characterized by the first round, and then the evolution takes place within
the boundaries already identified. As a result, the conflict evolves toward one that is less
uncertain and more focused on achieving some DM’s initial goals.
Moreover, this approach can accept slight changes in the objective within the bound-
aries defined in the first round so that the objective can vary in magnitude but not in
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achievement. For example, if the objective of the conflict is to secure shares of a water re-
source, the share needed may change, based on circumstances. On the other hand, a change
in the issue, for example from securing water share to an unrelated boundary dispute is
not considered as an evolution within the boundaries of the first round.
First 
round of a 
conflict 
Second round of 
a conflict 
n-round of a 
conflict 
Objective 
Figure 6.1: Inside-out Evolution of a Conflict
Objective 
First round of a 
conflict 
Second round of 
a conflict 
n-round of a 
conflict 
Figure 6.2: Outside-in Evolution of a Conflict
New rounds of the same conflict take place as DMs try to achieve what they failed to
achieve in the first round, even though the first round reached an equilibrium. In order
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to understand this phenomenon, attention should be directed to the very first round of
the conflict, where the conflict changes from incipient to active. At this stage, the issue
in dispute is clear. The disadvantage of traditional methodologies is that they treat all
options as standalone endpoints, where the concept of bargaining is between the options
and not within the options. In fact, options may have levels and dimensions.
In the original graph model for conflict resolution, complete information about the
conflict is assumed. The process may continue in that a DM tries to achieve more of
the same option that was a component of the original equilibrium. Having only two-level
options, the evolution of a conflict can sometimes be hard to model or explain. Utilizing the
proposed multi-level options, the graph model not only becomes more expressive, but also
more useful in understanding the evolution of conflicts. Partial achievement of objectives
through strategic option choices can now be visible to the analyst.
6.2.2 Multi-Level Options
Introducing multi-level options improves the description of a GMCR model by expressing
options in GMCR more realistically. Considering levels of options will facilitate the rep-
resentation of preferences, making the model more informative by covering more possible
scenarios in a single model. Moreover, multi-level options can shed light on the possible
conflict evolution direction. With binary options, a DM who is unsatisfied with an equi-
librium is considered to move away from equilibrium only when a unilateral improvement
becomes possible. However, using multi-level options a DM could continue to challenge
an equilibrium by trying to improve on the same equilibrium. See Fig. 6.3, which shows
two possible paths for conflict evolution, in one of which a DM deviates from an equilib-
rium to reach another one. On the second path, a DM attempts to improve on the same
equilibrium by increasing his or her share in a multi-level option.
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Figure 6.3: Analysis for Sustainable Resolution
The multi-level option form of the graph model is based on a finite set of options O and
retains the ownership function g : O −→ N , which indicates that option o ∈ O is owned
(exercised, or not) by DMg(o).
Definition 16. For each i ∈ N , let Oi denote the set of options controlled by DMi, thus
Oi = {k ∈ O : g(k) = i}. A state in S results when a level is specified for each option.
Definition 17. An option o ∈ O has v(o) levels, where v : O −→ {1, 2, 3, . . . }. Thus,
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the option o has L(o) = v(o) + 1 levels. In case v(o) = 1, then L(o) = 2 meaning
that option o is a binary option. For any option o ∈ O, DMg(o) must choose a level in
Mo = {0, 1, . . . v(o)}.
Definition 18. A state is an |O|-vector of non-negative integers (m1,m2, ...,m|O|) with
the property that for option oj, the integer mj satisfies 0 ≤ mj ≤ v(oj). The number of
possible states is
∏|O|
j=1[v(oj) + 1].
In order to make multi-level options easier to understand, a four level option Mk with
selection levels high (h), average (a), low (l), or no selection (N), can be represented as
f : Mk −→ {h, a, l, N}. The mapping function is:
f(Mk) =

h if DMg(o) selects option Mk with a high level of execution
a if DMg(o) selects option Mk with an average level of execution
l if DMg(o) selects option Mk with a low level of execution
N otherwise
Definition 19. Nearby states are states that are identical except for the level of one op-
tion. When a DM attempts to increase or decrease the level of an option contained in an
equilibrium, the DM is said to be attempting to reach a nearby state.
6.2.3 Analysis of Conflicts with Multi-Level Options
The steps to analyze a conflict with multi-level options differ slightly from a conflict with
binary options. As shown in Figure 6.4, the process starts with collecting the data about a
conflict, which is then used as an input to the GMCR model. In constructing the GMCR
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model, the process starts by generating all possible states, and then removing those that
are infeasible. In the modelling stage, options are defined as either a binary or multi-level.
In case of a multi-level option, there will be some nearby states, which only differ in the
level of one option. At the analysis stage, individual stability analysis is performed in
accordance with stability concepts as given in Section 2.3.1. By definition, equilibrium
arises when all DMs find the same state to be stable. More than one equilibrium within a
group of nearby states can indicate that there is a greater possibility of an equilibrium being
reached within this group. More importantly, when there is more than one equilibrium
within a group of nearby states, at least one of them can be identified as transitional.
Real World Conflict
Identify Input parameters
Decision- 
Makers
Options
Preferences
Construct GMCR Model
Perform Individual Stability 
Analysis for Decision Makers
Check for a Possible Equilibrium 
Evolution of Nearby States
Modelling
AnalysisIdentify Equilibrium States
Figure 6.4: Modelling and Analysis of Multi-Level Options
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A transitional equilibrium represents a resolution that is not sustainable. A DM may
attempt to reach to a transitional equilibrium in order to make a preferred nearby state
possible. For example, a startup company may accept deals with very low margins in
order to build a customer base or project profiles. When analyzing multi-level options, the
startup may have equilibrium with low price and high price deals; the low price equilibrium
may be transitional, making higher prices accessible.
In the following section, a modelling the Great Canadian Hydroelectric Power Conflict
using both (traditional) binary options and multi-level options is presented.
6.3 Case Study: The Great Canadian Hydroelectric
Power Conflict
A conflict between two Canadian provinces Newfoundland and Labrador (NL) and Que´bec
(QC) started in the late 1960s is described in Chapter 3 (Matbouli et al., 2014b). For
a protracted period, NL has sold almost all the power it produces from Churchill Falls
Hydroelectric Power to QC at a price much below the market value. In order to understand
this equilibrium, the negotiations that led the final contract are modelled in Table 6.2 using
binary options as originally modelled by Matbouli et al. (2012b, 2014b). Soon after a
definitive agreement was signed, NL tried unsuccessfully to amend the original contract; it
wanted to improve on the equilibrium by increasing the sale price of hydropower (Matbouli
et al., 2014b). The attempts of NL to rectify the price through legal challenges were
unsuccessful (The Supreme Court of Canada, 1988a,b).
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6.3.1 Modelling with Binary Options
Table 6.1 summarizes the DMs, and binary options available to the DMs during the contract
negotiations. Levels of options in Table 6.1 are selections of binary options, denoted by
Y , where a DM selects the corresponding option, and N where the DM chooses not to
exercise the option. Based on the negotiation model (Matbouli et al., 2012b), Table 6.2
shows the option form with two level options (Matbouli et al., 2012b). On the left side of
Table 6.2, there are three DMs: Brinco, QC, and Investors. Brinco is a NL crown company
that was given the rights to utilize hydropower potential of Churchill Falls. NL at the time
was not in a need for the power for its own use. Instead, the objective of Churchill Falls
development is to export hydropower generated electricity to interested buyers in Canada
and the United States (Feehan, 2011). In order to sell power, Brinco had to find a way to
transmit it. Their transmission options included transmitting power via QC or Maritimes.
Another option was to sell all power generated to QC at the border without controlling its
transmission (Feehan, 2011). Otherwise, the development of hydropower plant was at risk
of cancelling. QC, on the other hand, could sign an agreement based on proposals from
Brinco, or delay its signing. It is noteworthy to mention that this stage of the negotiations
came after a letter of intent was signed between Brinco and QC.
The twelve feasible states are shown across the top of Table 6.2. The preferences of DMs
are given in Table 6.3, ordered from most to least preferred, with some equally preferred
states. For more information on how preferences of the DMs are constructed, see Section
3.3.1 (Matbouli et al., 2014b). Figure 6.5 shows the graph form for Brinco. Nodes in
the graph indicate the states and the unilateral moves available to Brinco. In Figure 6.5
there are two groups of nodes. The group on the left side, are the consequence if the
investors choose not to finance Brinco’s choices. On the right side, the nodes represent
the agreement if the investors choose to finance Brinco. Moves between the two groups by
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the investors are possible, as shown in Figure 6.7. Within each group, Brinco can make
different selections, but if QC is involved, a deal can be reached only if QC agrees to sign,
as shown in Figure 6.6. Brinco, however, has a unilateral move available from both groups
of nodes, which is to cancel the project.
Table 6.1: Decision Makers, Binary Options, and Option Levels
DMs Options Short Form Option Levels
Brinco
Sell to Que´bec STQC {Y,N}
Transmit via Que´bec TVQC {Y,N}
Transmit via Maritime Route TVM {Y,N}
Call off - {Y,N}
QC
Sign - {Y,N}
Delay - {Y,N}
Investors Finance - {Y,N}
Table 6.2: Decision Makers, Options, and Outcomes for Churchill Falls Contract Negotia-
tions
DMs Options 
States 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Brinco 
STQC N Y N N Y N N Y N N Y N 
TVQC Y N N Y N N Y N N Y N N 
TVM N N Y N N N N N Y N N N 
Call off N N N N N Y N N N N N Y 
QC 
Sign Y Y - N N - Y Y - N N - 
Delay N N - Y Y - N N - Y Y - 
Investors Finance N N N N N N Y Y Y Y Y Y !
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Figure 6.5: Graph Form for Brinco with Binary Options
1 2 3 
4 5 
6 7 8 
9 10 11 12 
Figure 6.6: Graph Form for Que´bec
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Table 6.3: Decision Makers’ Preferences Ranking over Outcomes of Binary Options
DMs Preference Ranking
Brinco 7  8  9  11  10  12  6  1 ∼ 2 ∼ 3 ∼ 4 ∼ 5
QC 8  2  3 ∼ 4  6  5 ∼ 11  10 ∼ 12  1 ∼ 7  9
Investors 7 ∼ 8  1 ∼ 2  3 ∼ 4 ∼ 5 ∼ 6 ∼ 10  9 ∼ 11  12
2 3 1 
8 9 
6 4 5 
7 10 11 12 
Figure 6.7: Graph Form for Investors
6.3.2 Analysis of Binary Options Model
Stability analysis based on Nash and sequential stability (SEQ) (Nash, 1950, 1951; Fraser
and Hipel, 1979, 1984), gives the equilibrium states for the binary options model shown in
Table 6.4. There are four equilibria. At state 6, the equilibrium represents the situation
when Brinco decides to cancel the development. At states 7 and 8, QC agrees to sign a
proposal by Brinco to transmit power via Que´bec and sell to Que´bec respectively. State
9, on the other hand, represents the outcome that the investors agree to finance the power
transmission line via the Maritimes.
98
Table 6.4: Equilibrium States for Binary Options Model
DMs Options 
Equilibrium States 
6 7 8 9 
Brinco 
STQC N N Y N 
TVQC N Y N N 
TVM N N N Y 
Call off Y N N N 
QC 
Sign - Y Y - 
Delay - N N - 
Investors Finance N Y Y Y !
6.3.3 Modelling with Multi-Level Options
Looking back at the DMs’ options in Table 6.1, there is an opportunity to represent one of
Brinco’s options as multi-level, as now proposed in Table 6.5. The original binary option
for Brinco is to offer to sell all power generated from the Churchill Falls hydropower plant
to QC at the border. But if this option is selected, the sale price may have several levels,
high, average, or low, relative to the market price at the time. These price levels were not
considered in the original binary options model. Strategies that can be selected for each
option now have multiple levels, as summarized in Table 6.5.
In the original formulation of this model, there was a difficulty in describing Brinco’s
preferences, because Brinco appeared to prefer the sale of power to QC over transmitting
via Maritimes (see Table 6.3). However, later in the conflict NL started to work on building
a Maritimes transmission link to reach buyers beyond QC. This preference was difficult to
capture in the original model because Brinco’s preferences in regard to selling the power to
QC versus transmitting it directly to the buyers depend on the price it receives from QC
for the sale. If the price represents the market price, Brinco will prefer to sell to QC rather
99
than building an expensive transmission line. However, if the price was significantly less
than market value, then Brinco, and later NL as it took over full control of Brinco, could
prefer to select the expensive and challenging Maritimes route (see the new preference
ranking in Table 6.7).
Brinco’s offer of sale to QC now becomes a multi-level option with k = 4. The levels
depend on the price offer: high (h), average (a), or low (l).
Table 6.6 gives the multi-level option negotiations model. The number of feasible states
has increased from 12 to 20, because each occurrence of sale in the option form is now
replaced with three levels, instead of one. Looking at the preferences of Brinco in Table
6.3 in comparison to Table 6.7 produces some interesting insights. Brinco would prefer
to sell power to QC rather than choose the expensive Maritimes route only when the sale
price is high or average. This important feature of preference was absent in the original
model of Table 6.3. Hence, this information at the modelling stage helps explain why this
conflict evolved in future rounds. The market price of hydropower surged dramatically
following the signing of the final contract between Brinco and QC. As a result, the sale
price became very low compared to the market price, which motivated NL to change its
strategy when it came to developing the remaining hydropower potential of the Churchill
River (See (Matbouli et al., 2014b)). This valuable insight strengthens the model because
it demonstrates the possibility of future evolution of the original conflict, which does not
appear without multi-level options. Utilizing such options not only makes preferences more
expressive of reality, but also facilitates the understanding of possible future rounds of the
conflict.
Figure 6.8 shows the moves available to Brinco considering multi-level options. There
are multiple nodes drawn at states 2, 5, 8 and 11. Each of theses states now represents a
group of nearby states that differ only in the levels of the selling price.
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Table 6.5: Decision Makers, Multi-Level Options and Selection Levels
DMs Options Number of Levels Option Levels
Brinco
STQC L(o) = 4 {h, a, l, N}
TVQC L(o) = 2 {Y,N}
TVM L(o) = 2 {Y,N}
Call off L(o) = 2 {Y,N}
QC
Sign L(o) = 2 {Y,N}
Delay L(o) = 2 {Y,N}
Investors Finance L(o) = 2 {Y,N}
Table 6.6: Decision Makers, Multi-Level Options, and Outcomes
DMs Options 
States 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
1 2.1 2.2 2.3 3 4 5.1 5.2 5.3 6 7 8.1 8.2 8.3 9 10 11.1 11.2 11.3 12 
Brinco 
STQC N h a l N N h a l N N h a l N N h a l N 
TVQC Y N N N N Y N N N N Y N N N N Y N N N N 
TVM N N N N Y N N N N N N N N N Y N N N N N 
Call off N N N N N N N N N Y N N N N N N N N N Y 
QC 
Sign Y Y Y Y - N N N N - Y Y Y Y - N N N N - 
Delay N N N N - Y Y Y Y - N N N N - Y Y Y Y - 
Investors Finance N N N N N N N N N N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y !
6.3.4 Analysis of the Multi-Level Options Model
Equilibrium states that result from the analysis of the multi-level option model are listed
in Table 6.8. Some of the equilibria can be compared to the equilibria of the binary option
model. However, there are two new equilibria, at states 13 and 14, both in which Brinco’s
offer of sale of power to QC is accepted and the investors agree to finance. States 13 and 14
are nearby states differing only in the selling price, which is average at state 13 and low at
state 14. These two nearby equilibria provides an interesting insights on the possibility of
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Table 6.7: Decision Makers’ Preferences Ranking over Outcomes of Multi-Level Options
DMs Preference Ranking
Brinco 12  13  11  15  16 ∼ 17 ∼ 18 ∼ 19 ∼ 20  14  10  1 ∼ 2 ∼ 3 ∼ 4  5 ∼ 6 ∼ 7 ∼ 8 ∼ 9
QC 14  4  19  9  5 ∼ 6 ∼ 8  10  7  16 ∼ 17 ∼ 18  20  1 ∼ 3 ∼ 11 ∼ 13 ∼ 15  2 ∼ 12
Investors 12  11 ∼ 13  14  2  1 ∼ 3  4  5 ∼ 6 ∼ 7 ∼ 8 ∼ 9 ∼ 10 ∼ 15  16 ∼ 17 ∼ 18 ∼ 19  20
7 
8 
9 10 
11 
12 
1 
2 
3 4 
5 
6 
Figure 6.8: Graph Form for Brinco with Multi-Level Options
evolution of the conflict. If the conflict where to evolve, it could be because a DM, Brinco
in this case, is trying to reach a nearby equilibrium, which is considered an improvement
on the level of the selling price.
6.4 Conclusions
Options are a useful approach to conflict resolution modelling because they represent pos-
sible courses of actions of each DM. The original structure of options in the graph model is
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Table 6.8: Equilibrium States for Multi-Level Options Model
DMs Options 
Equilibrium States 
10 11 13 14 15 
6 7 8.2 8.3 9 
Brinco 
STQC N N a l N 
TVQC N Y N N N 
TVM N N N N Y 
Call off Y N N N N 
QC 
Sign - Y Y Y - 
Delay - N N N - 
Investors Finance N Y Y Y Y !
described in terms of binary options—the DM must chose either to select or not to select
an option. However, it is natural to think that a DM considering an option may select
a partial move toward the full option. DMs can bargain about how much each DM is
willing to offer or need to receive in order to reach a compromise. The multi-level option
structure, as proposed in this chapter, is very useful in expressing the problem as DMs see
it. Conditional preferences can be easily represented. Moreover, some strategic insights
can be gained in the analysis of multi-level options model. It is possible for the analyst to
detect possible nearby equilibria that will facilitate the understanding of conflict evolution.
Furthermore, using multi-level options provides an opportunity to analyze a DM strategic
selection of moves that will led him or her to a transitional equilibrium, in order to make
a more preferred outcome accessible.
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6.5 Chapter Summary
An expansion to the options structure is proposed to make the option-based graph model
for conflict resolution more explicitly expressive of reality. The suggested improvement
provides an opportunity to replace binary (on or off) options with multi-level options,
wherein the decision maker (DM) selects one out of more than two distinct levels. The
new approach simplifies the representation of conflicts and facilitates the understanding
of their evolution by showing, in negotiations for example, outcomes that involve partial
achievement of a DM’s objectives. The preferences of decision makers can now be related
to the possibility of tradeoffs between (or among) options.
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Chapter 7
Conclusions and Future Research
In this thesis, a number of challenges in the modelling and analysis of sustainable conflict
resolution are addressed. The contributions to making conflict resolution sustainable are
summarized according to modelling and analysis.
7.1 Modelling for Sustainable Conflict Resolution
7.1.1 Characterization of a Conflict
Looking at a single round of a conflict, in isolation from prior and future conflict, can
obscure the general picture of a conflict, making it hard to model. A framework for
the characterization of a conflict is proposed in order to capture relevant information
about a real world conflict. An analyst can now systematically study a conflict with
emphasis on its first round. Using the characterization stages can help highlight situations
in which a conflict exists but is dormant. A dormant conflict is not a resolved conflict,
but is in a period that precedes an active round. Proactive conflict resolution intervention
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should take advantage of this stage before an active conflict begins. The need for conflict
characterization is exemplified by the Great Canadian Hydroelectric Power conflict, which
progressed throughout multiple rounds.
7.1.2 The Preference Graph Model for Conflict Resolution
The Graph Model for Conflict Resolution (GMCR) is a flexible modelling technique for
formally investigating conflicts with any number of DMs. The ability to represent different
types of moves gives the graph model an advantage over other modelling schemes. Having
the preferences of DMs represented on the graph makes the graph model even more useful.
Such enhancements to the graph model makes interpretation of two important stability
concepts possible by looking at the graph. Moreover, embedding the preferences into the
graph portion of the model assists an analyst in understanding the direction of a DM
moves, even when there is no available move. This is possible because a desired move that
is not available unilaterally may be an opportunity for forming a coalition.
7.1.3 Multi-Level Options
One modelling limitation that appeared when applying the original graph model to the
Great Canadian Hydroelectric Power conflict is the inaccuracy of describing the prefer-
ences. Brinco would prefer selling power to QC over transferring power via the Maritimes
route when sale price reflects market value. Different levels of the offer to sell are not vis-
ible without the structure of multi-level options. The expansion of options facilitates the
representation of important information about a DM’s available actions and preferences.
As well, the introduction of multi-level options makes options representation more natural
by representing strategies selections of options that are not necessarily binary.
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7.2 Analysis for Sustainable Conflict Resolution
When analyzing a conflict using the graph model, it is not uncommon to have more than
one equilibrium. Robustness of equilibria in the graph model, a new concept, is an approach
to assessing equilibrium sustainability. The Level of Freedom concept enables the analyst
to rank equilibria based on their robustness. This provides an interesting insight into the
resiliency of an equilibrium against deviation for conflict resolution purposes.
Moreover, analysis of nearby equilibrium states, which could result from a multi-level
option model, provides strategic insights into the possibility of a transitional resolution.
DMs could challenge an equilibrium not only to achieve a different objective, but sometimes
to improve on an equilibrium that is only partially satisfactory.
7.3 Ideas for Future Research
Research in conflict resolution modelling and analysis using systematic approaches is lim-
ited, so there are many opportunities to contribute to this field. Each chapter of this thesis,
especially Chapters 5 and 6, provides foundations to a new research direction for the graph
model. The introduction of multi-level options is new and could be further expanded to
handle complex structures of preferences. It can also be used to model dynamic changes
during the course of a conflict. Furthermore, multi-level options may enable analysis of
bargaining and trade-offs without using quantitative utility values to indicate preferences.
Robustness of equilibria is an important direction that requires further research. Im-
provements to definitions of robustness of equilibria and new ways to measure it are needed
to detect the likelihood of having a temporary equilibrium. Moreover, the methodologies
proposed in this thesis are applied to graph models with complete information. There is an
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opportunity to develop and utilize probability theory, fuzzy logic, grey numbers, and hy-
pergames, in order to account for uncertainty and misperception in modelling and analysis.
In addition, the definition of Level of Freedom could be revised to define different classes
of Level of Freedom considering the foresight of DMs. For example, one could investigate
the freedom of a DM to move considering one step, two steps, or n-steps into future.
As well, conflict characterization could also be further developed. For example, one
could use Stakeholder Identification and Influence Theory (Mitchell et al., 1997; Frooman,
1999) to identify DMs in a conflict and their degrees of involvement. Furthermore, the
graphical representation of a model could be further enhanced to make preferences more
easily read and strategic behaviours easier to understand.
7.4 Publications During PhD Studies
In this section, the author of the thesis would like to present the list of papers published
or accepted during his PhD program at the University of Waterloo. Most of the following
refereed journal and conference papers have been integrated into the writing of this thesis:
7.4.1 Journal Papers
1. Matbouli, Y. T., Hipel, K. W., and Kilgour, D. M. (2014b). Strategic analysis of the
Great Canadian Hydroelectric power conflict. Energy Strategy Reviews, 4(0):43 – 51.
2. Matbouli, Y. T., Hipel, K. W., Kilgour, D. M., and Karray, F. (2014c). A fuzzy
logic approach to assess, manage, and communicate carcinogenic risk. Human and
Ecological Risk Assessment: An International Journal, 20(6):1687–1707.
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3. Matbouli, Y. T., Kilgour, D. M., and Hipel, K. W. (2015c). Robustness of equilibrium
in the graph model for conflict resolution. Systems Science and Systems Engineering.
Accepted for publication on October 8, 2015
7.4.2 Conference Papers
Full Papers
4. Matbouli, Y. T., Hipel, K. W., and Kilgour, D. M. (2015a). Introducing multi-level
options to the graph model of conflict resolution. In Systems, Man, and Cybernetics
(SMC), 2015 IEEE International Conference on, City University of Hong Kong, Hong
Kong, Just Accepted
5. Matbouli, Y. T., Hipel, K. W., and Kilgour, D. M. (2014a). A fresh perspective on
robustness of equilibrium in the graph model. In Systems, Man, and Cybernetics
(SMC), 2014 IEEE International Conference on, pages 2936–2941, Paradise Point
Resort and Spa, San Diego, CA, USA.
6. Matbouli, Y. T., Hipel, K. W., and Kilgour, D. M. (2013a). Characterization of a con-
flict. In Systems, Man, and Cybernetics (SMC), 2013 IEEE International Conference
on, pages 2050 – 2054, Midland Hotel, Manchester, United Kingdom.
7. Matbouli, Y. T., Hipel, K. W., and Kilgour, D. M. (2012b). The Upper Churchill
Falls development negotiations. In Systems, Man, and Cybernetics (SMC), 2012
IEEE International Conference, pages 2762–2767, COEX (Convention and Exhibition
Center), Seoul, Korea.
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Extended Abstracts
8. Matbouli, Y. T., Hipel, K. W., and Kilgour, D. M. (2015b). Multi-level options in
the graph model for conflict resolution. In Kamin´ski, B., Kersten, G., Szufel, P.,
Jakubczyj, M., and Wachowicz, T., editors, The 15th International Conference on
Group Decision & Negotiation Letters, pages 253–256, Warsaw School of Economics,
Warsaw, Poland. Warsaw School of Economics Press.
9. Matbouli, Y. T., Kilgour, D. M., and Hipel, K. W. (2014d). The preference graph
model for conflict resolution. In Zarate´, P., Camilleri, G., Kamissoko, D., and Am-
blard, F., editors, Group Decision and Negotiation – GDN 2014 Proceedings of the
Joint International Conference of the INFORMS GDN Section and the EURO Work-
ing Group on DSS, pages 244–249, University Toulouse 1 Capitole, Toulouse, France.
Toulouse University.
10. Matbouli, Y. T., Hipel, K. W., and Kilgour, D. M. (2013c). Robustness of equilibrium
in conflict resolution. In Group Decision and Negotiation – GDN 2013, pages 52–
53, Department of Computer and Systems Sciences (DSV), Stockholm University,
Stockholm, Sweden.
11. Matbouli, Y. T., Hipel, K. W., and Kilgour, D. M. (2013b). Evolution of the Great
Canadian Hydroelectric conflict. In 6th International Conference on Water Resources
and Environment Research (ICWRER2013), Rhein-Mosel-Halle, Koblenz, Germany.
12. Matbouli, Y. T., Hipel, K. W., and Kilgour, D. M. (2012a). The Great Canadian
Hydroelectric Power conflict: Contract negotiations. In de Almeida, A. T., Morais,
D. C., and de Franca Dantas Daher, S., editors, Group Decision and Negotiation 2012
Conference (GDN 2012), volume I, pages 96–99, Golden Tulip Recife Palace Hotel,
Recife, Pernambuco, Brazil.
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7.5 Chapter Summary
Finally, as indicated in the title of this thesis “Sustainable Conflict Resolution: Modelling,
Analysis, and Strategic Insights”, a number of proposed methodologies to provide insights
into the evolution and resolution of conflicts have been put forward. To explain why
an equilibrium may change has been addressed using the characterization of a conflict,
robustness of equilibria, and analysis of nearby states using multi-level options. The ana-
lyst may choose what kind of approach to use in a potential case study. These proposed
methodologies are general and can be applied to conflicts arising in different fields, such as
engineering, business, and international affairs. Although all of the proposed methodolo-
gies can be integrated to analyze a long-term conflict, each method can be separately used
without the others. An analyst may choose to apply the robustness of equilibria measure
and not multi-level options, and vice versa. However, the characterization of a conflict, is
always relevant, and can provide input parameters to a conflict resolution model. Prefer-
ence graphics are also a useful tool for the presentation of a conflict to DMs, in order to
furnish a sense of possible directions of a conflict.
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